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CRITICAL HABITAT AND THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING SMALL HARMS 
Dave Owen* 
This Article investigates how the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, and the courts are implementing the Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on 
“adverse modification” of “critical habitat.”  That prohibition appears to be one of 
environmental law’s most ambitious mandates, but its actual meaning and effect are contested. 
Using a database of over 4,000 “biological opinions,” interviews with agency staff, and a review 
of judicial decisions considering the adverse modification prohibition, the Article assesses the 
extent to which the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the 
courts are relying on the adverse modification prohibition to provide habitat protection.  It also 
assesses the extent to which they are providing habitat protection by invoking other ESA 
provisions.  The Article concludes that agency practice and some judicial decisions substantially 
depart from statutory requirements, with problematic results, but that the agencies still are 
providing substantial habitat protection through other means.  It then considers the implications 
of these findings, first for ongoing debates about ESA implementation and reform and then for 
broader discussions about legal strategies for responding to small environmental harms and the 
incremental degradation they cause. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 7, 2010, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) reluctantly1 
designated 187,157 square miles of “critical habitat” for the polar bear,2 a species protected 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).3  According to the agency, this was a fairly 
inconsequential act.  FWS predicted minimal regulatory changes,4 only the slightest of economic 
impacts,5 and no conservation benefit to the species.6  But those predictions are difficult to 
                                                
* Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law.  I thank Rachel Bouvier for statistical help; 
Dmitry Bam, Eric Biber, David Cluchey, Holly Doremus, Sarah Schindler, and Jenny Wriggins for comments on 
earlier drafts; participants in the New England Junior Faculty Scholarship Workshop at Suffolk University for 
comments on the project concept; many Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service staff 
members for conducting interviews and responding to my extensive FOIA requests; and Shannon Carroll for 
exceptional research assistance. 
1 Litigation had forced the agency’s hand.  See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Proposes Polar Bear Critical 
Habitat, October 22, 2009, at 
http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/pdf/PB%20CritHab%20Prop.NR.FINAL.pdf. 
2 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg. 76086 , 76086 (Dec. 7, 2010) 
3 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006). 
4 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC. AND NORTHERN ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DESIGNATION OF 
CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE POLAR BEAR IN THE UNITED STATES ES-6 (2010) (“Critical habitat is therefore not 
expected to result in additional regulation”). 
5 Id. (“economic impacts are forecast to be limited to additional administrative costs”). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1775126
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reconcile with the text of the ESA.  The statute’s protections for critical habitat appear extensive 
and stringent; they are, according to one prominent legal scholar, “the highest promontory of the 
boldest section of the strongest environmental law in the world.”7  The potential objects of 
regulation are almost infinitely numerous, for the habitat of the polar bear is threatened by 
greenhouse gas emissions throughout the nation.8  Some environmental advocates therefore 
hope, and some industries fear, that the designation has created a legal lever to halt some of the 
actions that are incrementally consigning the polar bear to extinction.9 
The plight of the polar bear is compelling in its own right—the species has become the 
poster animal for climate change activism—and it also exemplifies a classic legal challenge.  
Many of environmental law’s greatest remaining problems are caused by the cumulative effects 
of many actions, each of which contributes only a small increment to the larger problem.10  If the 
causal links between those individual actions and the larger problem are indirect, uncertain, or 
obscure, the problems become even harder to address.11  Climate change is a classic example; 
although the ultimate environmental challenge is enormous, no single actor is the primary cause, 
and millions of actions incrementally contribute.  But it is not the only one.  The United States’ 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 Id. at ES-7 (“the Service does not anticipate that the designation of critical habitat will result in additional 
conservation requirements for the polar bear”). 
7 William H. Rodgers Jr., Indian Tribes, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE 
CONSERVATION PROMISE 170, 170 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds. 2006). 
8 See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 
Fed. Reg. 28212, 28292-93 (May 15, 2008).  The bear also is threatened by emissions from the rest of the world, but 
the ESA’s extraterritorial effect is limited. 
9 See, e.g., Carl Portman, Resource Dev. Council, Comments of the Resource Development Council - 
Proposed Rule to Designate Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (FWS-R7-ES-2009-0042) 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FWS-R7-ES-2009-0042-0230.2 (warning of a “vast disconnect 
between the Service’s findings and assurances … and the intentions of [the Center for Biological Diversity] and 
other environmental groups”).   FWS has taken pains to deny the possibility of such regulation.  See INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMICS, INC. AND NORTHERN ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at ES-6 (“Critical habitat designation for the polar bear 
will not be used by the Service as a vehicle to regulate climate change.”). 
10 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 64-65 (2010); William Odum, 
Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 728 (1982). 
11 See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1545-46 
(1999). 
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greatest remaining water quality challenges arise from the cumulative effect of many sources of 
stormwater runoff.12  Some of the most persistent air pollution problems derive largely from the 
collective emissions of millions of engines.13  Indeed, similar challenges pervade regulatory 
governance, as the recent economic crisis—a crisis brought on by the cumulative effect of 
thousands of ill-advised mortgages and risky investment decisions—made abundantly clear.  
Finding legal solutions for these problems is not easy,14 but it is essential. 
This Article advances that search by considering regulatory protection of critical habitat.  
That protection flows primarily from section 7 of the ESA, which prohibits federal agencies from 
taking, permitting, or funding any action “likely to … result in the destruction or adverse 
modification” of critical habitat.15  In theory, this “adverse modification” prohibition, as it is 
conventionally known, should address the sort of incremental environmental degradation that 
threatens many species, including the polar bear.16  Indeed, it appears to be one of the farthest-
reaching mandates in all of environmental law.17  Practice, however, may be very different.  To 
explore how the services actually protect critical habitat, I reviewed the results of approximately 
three thousand recent “biological opinions” prepared by the FWS or the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS; collectively, I refer to both agencies as “the services”).18  These 
biological opinions analyze whether a federal action will impermissibly affect critical habitat or 
“jeopardize” the survival of listed species. 19  In practice, biological opinions have, as the 
                                                
12 See Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 610-11 (2008). 
13 See, e.g., Carol Rose, Environmental Law Grows up (More or Less), and what Science Can Do to Help, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 279-80, 283-84 (2005) (providing examples from water and air pollution control); 
Ruhl and Salzman, supra note 10, at 74-75 (describing causes of urban sprawl). 
14 See Stephen R. Dovers, Sustainability: Demands on Policy, 16 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 303, 312 
(1996) (asserting that the difficulty “stems in large part from the inherent inability of the mainstay of most 
environmental policy, project oriented assessment, to handle impacts accruing from a number of separate projects”). 
15 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See Rogers, supra note 7, at 170. 
18 For discussion of the process through which the services generate these opinions, see infra Part II.A.2. 
19 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (2006). 
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Supreme Court has put it, a “virtually determinative” effect upon whether and how federal 
actions proceed.20  I also reviewed all judicial decisions considering regulatory protections for 
critical habitat.21  Finally, I interviewed agency staff to explore their experiences with critical 
habitat protection.  The result is the first systematic empirical review of the ways critical habitat 
actually receives regulatory protection.22 
This inquiry begins filling a substantial gap in the otherwise extensive literature on the 
ESA.  Though critical habitat has been highly controversial23—“an agony of the ESA,” in 
Professor Oliver Houck’s words24—the controversy has swirled primarily around critical habitat 
designations.  Few studies have attempted to explain how the services actually protect critical 
habitat once it is designated, or to what effect, and none has provided the breadth or depth of this 
inquiry.  Perceptions vary widely.  Some legal commentators have suggested that the critical 
habitat provisions create remarkably powerful protective mechanisms.25  Some economic studies 
have found, or simply assumed, dramatic impacts upon regulated entities.26  But the services 
have often claimed that the critical habitat provisions are completely redundant, and that other 
                                                
20 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997). 
21 A larger body of caselaw considers decisions to designate critical habitat, but my focus is on what 
happens after a designation is finalized. 
22 While broad, the review is not comprehensive.  See infra Part III (describing regulatory effects not 
addressed by this study). 
23 See John Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. OF LAND USE AND ENVTL. L. 203, 
205 (2009) (describing critical habitat as “especially controversial”); Scott Norris, Only 30: A Portrait of the 
Endangered Species Act as a Young Law, 54 BIOSCIENCE 288, 291 (2004) (“If the Endangered Species Act … has 
become a battleground, the front line is the issue of critical habitat.”). 
24 Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of 
Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV 277, 297 (1993). 
25 See, e.g., James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat under the Endangered Species 
Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 311 (1990) (“the ESA’s most controversial and influential enforcement tool”); 
Rodgers, supra note 7. 
26 Jeffrey E. Zabel and Robert W. Patterson, The Effects of Critical Habitat Designation on Housing 
Supply: An Analysis of California Housing Construction Activity, 46 J. OF REGIONAL SCI. 67, 90 (2005) (finding 
substantial effects even outside the designated critical habitat area); John M. Quigley and Aaron M. Swoboda, The 
urban impacts of the Endangered Species Act: A general equilibrium analysis, 61 J. OF URBAN ECON. 299, 304 
(2007) (“For simplicity, we assume that lands designated as critical habitat cannot be used to produce housing at 
all.”).  
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statutory provisions obviate the need for the “adverse modification” prohibition to exist.27  A few 
studies have used regression analyses to test whether critical habitat designations lead to 
improvements in species status, but the results are conflicting, and the studies do not purport to 
explain why critical habitat protection is (or is not) producing results.28  Other researchers have 
used case studies to explore ways in which critical habitat can provide protection, but, as with 
any case study, the potential for drawing generalized conclusions is limited.29  The process of 
implementing the adverse modification prohibition therefore remains a black box with disputed 
outputs, and a primary purpose of this inquiry is to expose that black box’s inner workings.30  
The results reveal a large discrepancy between statutory requirements and actual practice.  
Notwithstanding statutory language that seems to mandate a major role for the adverse 
modification prohibition, the services have given it hardly any independent significance, instead 
treating the prohibition as a redundant add-on to the ESA’s other protective measures.31  The 
services also have consistently treated small-scale habitat degradation as exempt from the 
adverse modification prohibition, even though no such exemption appears in the ESA itself.32  
That approach has persisted even after a series of court cases called it into question.  The services 
                                                
27 Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in 
Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31871, 31872 (1999) (“For almost all species, the adverse 
modification and jeopardy standards are the same., resulting in critical habitat being an expensive regulatory process 
that duplicates the protection already provided by the jeopardy standard.”).  For discussion of those other provisions, 
see infra Part II. 
28 See Martin F. J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative Analysis, 
55 BIOSCIENCE 360, 361-63 (2005) (“Critical habitat promotes species survival and recovery.”); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
356, 384 (1997) (“Designation of critical habitat appeared to benefit species, but the evidence for this proposition 
was weak.”); but see Joe Kerkvliet and Christian Langpap, Learning from endangered and threatened species 
recovery programs: A case study using the U.S. Endangered Species Act recovery scores, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
499, 506-07 (2007) (finding no causal relationship). 
29 See Kieran F. Suckling and Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT AT 30: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 80-85 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds 2006). 
30 This problem is not limited to the ESA’s critical habitat provisions. See Barton H. Thompson, The 
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 40 STAN. L. REV. 305, 307 (1997) (“One problem 
with undertaking a case study of the ESA is that there is a scarcity of verifiable data and information.”). 
31 See infra Part IV. 
32 See id. 
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also have struggled to articulate a standard for determining what constitutes adverse 
modification, and, in many individual biological opinions, have offered rationales that seem to 
ignore both statutory text and the incremental nature of the habitat degradation most species 
face.33  While critical habitat has assumed slightly more significance in the courts, the judiciary 
also has not decided how protective the critical habitat provisions should be.34  The provisions 
have had some impact, notwithstanding the services’ periodic assertions that critical habitat 
designations are purely a waste of money and time.  But the effects on regulatory processes, 
though real, have been minor and subtle. 
These disparities between statutory text and actual practice are only half of the story, 
however.  Even if the adverse modification prohibition is doing little to protect critical habitat, 
the services are invoking other provisions of the ESA as substitutes.35  Those efforts are 
extensive and, in some ways, pragmatic and creative.36  There are problems with these 
alternative approaches—most importantly, they seem designed to slow rather than stop habitat 
degradation—but they nevertheless provide substantial habitat protection, albeit not in the ways 
the statute itself might lead one to expect.37   
These paradoxical results undermine some of the classic narratives of ESA 
implementation and, more generally, are inconsistent with some prevalent understandings of 
administrative agency behavior.  One of the dominant narratives, raised often though not 
exclusively by opponents of the act, suggests the ESA creates an inflexible “command-and-
control” regulatory scheme.38  That view reflects a broader criticism alleging that environmental 
law is generally characterized by rigid, top-down schemes myopically implemented by tunnel-
                                                
33 See infra Part IV.A. 
34 See infra Part IV.C. 
35 See infra Part IV.B. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See infra Part V.A. 
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visioned agencies.39 A rather different critique, often asserted by frustrated supporters of the 
act’s basic goals, asserts that the ESA is a “paper tiger,”40 which reluctant agencies implement 
only to the extent compelled by the citizen suits of non-governmental litigants.41  Though these 
critiques may seem nearly opposite, both share an underlying cynicism about governmental 
implementation of the ESA—a cynicism that also typifies much of the rhetoric of regulatory 
governance.42   In both narratives, the services are somewhat passive entities, either 
implementing an unreasonable statute with mindless rigidity or persistently bowing to the 
focused pressure of moneyed interest groups,43 and ESA implementation is fundamentally 
flawed.  Not surprisingly, both narratives also support calls for dramatic reforms.   
But neither narrative explains what the services are actually doing.  The assertions of 
inflexibility are belied by the services’ selective non-use of a seemingly mandatory statutory 
provision.  They also cannot explain the services’ substitute approaches, for despite the 
conventional characterizations of ESA-based regulation as a centralized, rigid, command-and-
control scheme, those alternative approaches have evolved largely through decentralized, 
negotiation-driven processes.44  The paper tiger narrative comes closer to the mark, for the 
                                                
39 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 203, 213 (describing a “burdensome” system with “many grievous flaws”). 
40 See J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) 
(explaining (and rejecting) this view of the ESA). 
41 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 24, at 311 (“the ESA’s prohibitions against jeopardy and habitat designation 
are enforced solely through citizen actions in the courts”).  
42 Even President Obama, though generally sympathetic to regulatory initiatives, has prominently belittled 
this scheme.  See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the State of the Union Address, January 25, 2011, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address (suggesting that a 
bifurcated system of authority over salmon exemplifies a flawed “government of the past”).  
43 This view parallels conceptions of administrative agency action prevalent both in some law-and-
economics critiques of regulatory governance, in public choice theory, and, though from a different ideological 
perspective, in environmentalists’ arguments in favor of citizen intervention in administrative decisionmaking.  See, 
e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Instruments in Regulatory Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 
320-21 (1998) (summarizing law and economics studies asserting that regulatory policy passively reflects external 
interests); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 17–21 
(1991) (describing public choice theory, which asserts a similar view and informs many of the law and economics 
studies); JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 63-64 (1970). 
44 See infra Part V.A. 
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services’ chosen regulatory approaches depart from statutory text in ways that appear to 
compromise species protection.  But the services still are providing a lot of habitat protection, 
often in the face of intense resistance, and even where external pressure from environmental 
groups can provide at most a partial explanation for their actions.45  The incompleteness of both 
of these narratives has implications for ESA reform efforts and for environmental law reform 
more generally.  Most importantly, while reforms are needed, they need not be drastic.  Existing 
law and existing institutions contain positive features worth building upon. 
 The Article therefore closes by recommending several modest reforms, and in so doing 
returns to one of the core dilemmas of regulating incremental environmental degradation.  Any 
such regulatory effort must resolve when, if ever, harms are too small to address, and how to 
compensate for the harms that escape regulatory coverage.46  The services have never figured out 
a coherent answer to those questions.  Workable answers do exist; a combination of regulatory 
approaches developed in several other areas of environmental law could improve the critical 
habitat program.47  None of these approaches is a panacea, each has its critics and its flaws, and 
my recommendations in combination may seem to prescribe a sort of regulatory kitchen-sink 
soup.  But the jumble is partly the point.  The sometimes-bewildering complexity of 
environmental law can make simplification seem like an essential goal, and one might readily 
presume that some single regulatory instrument—perhaps an existing tool, perhaps something 
new—should predominate.48  The critical habitat experience illustrates, however, that regulators 
                                                
45 See infra Part V.B. 
46 This question was famously addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which 
noted that agencies should “whittle away” at massive problems.   549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).  But that observation 
begs the question, answered by neither the majority nor the dissent, how one determines when the cut is too small to 
be worth the whittler’s effort. 
47 See infra Part VI. 
48 See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 
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often need a variety of tools, and, subject to some statutory guidance, can and will use that 
variety in creative and effective ways.  Environmental law’s cacophony of regulatory approaches 
and options therefore holds value, and the best approach for addressing major environmental 
challenges will be not some dazzling new innovation but rather a complex, label-defying 
combination of existing approaches. 
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows.  Part II explains how the ESA protects 
critical habitat and how those provisions fit within the larger statutory scheme.  Part III explains 
the methodology I used to assess how the services implement those provisions in practice.  Part 
IV sets forth the results, exploring both the discrepancy between statutory mandates and actual 
practice and the alternative ways the services are providing habitat protection.  Part V considers 
the implications of those results for traditional views of the ESA, and concludes that the results 
undermine two of the predominant narratives of ESA implementation.  Part VI explains how the 
services’ regulatory approaches could be improved.  It also reflects more broadly on this study’s 
lessons for regulatory efforts to address the challenges of incremental environmental 
degradation. 
 
II.  THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
The ESA is the United States’ most important law for the protection of biodiversity.  The 
act is designed to prevent the extinction of imperiled animal and plant species and to promote 
those species’ recovery.49  To those ends, it requires the services to “list” species that are in 
                                                                                                                                                       
39 ENVTL. L. 43, 57 (2009) (citing “a regulatory complexity that is mind-boggling” as a primary reason for 
environmental law’s alleged failure). 
49 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (defining “conservation” of species as the core statutory goal); id. § 1532(3) 
(defining conservation in terms of recovery). 
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danger of extinction50 and to designate critical habitat for those species.51  It then provides listed 
species and their habitat with a series of regulatory protections. 
The ESA’s focus on habitat is no coincidence.  For decades, scientists have been warning 
that habitat loss is the single most important threat to biodiversity,52 and Congress was well 
aware of this threat when it enacted the statute. 53 The challenge has only grown in recent years, 
with climate change now adding to a host of pre-existing stressors.54  Some predictions of the 
combined impacts of these stressors are staggering.  A 2004 study published in Science, for 
example, predicted that with the added stress caused by climate change, 15% to 37% of all global 
species could be committed to extinction by 2050.55 
This section explains the ESA’s habitat-protection provisions, beginning with critical 
habitat, then discussing other key provisions that are partially, though not exclusively, focused 
on habitat protection, and then explaining how—on paper, at least—the different provisions 
would seem to interact. 
 A.  The Critical Habitat Requirements 
  1.  Definitions and designation procedures 
Critical habitat is a crucial portion of the historic habitat of a threatened or endangered 
species.  ESA section 3 defines the term “critical habitat” as including both occupied and 
unoccupied habitat with “physical or biological features… essential to the conservation of the 
                                                
50 See id. § 1533. 
51 Id. § 1533(a)(3). 
52 See, e.g., David .S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying threats to imperiled species in the United States, 48 
BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 (1998). 
53 See Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of 
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 143 & n.65 (2004). 
54 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WORKING GROUP II: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTION AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 (2007); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change 
and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
55 Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 (2004); see IPCC, 
supra note 54, at 11 (“Approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at 
increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature exceed 1.5-2.5°C.”). 
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species.”56  The statute sets some limits on the breadth of the designation, and critical habitat 
cannot include the entire historic range of the species.57  The services also may invoke economic 
costs to exclude some areas from the designation.58  But if habitat is necessary for the species’ 
survival or recovery, it should be included. 
In almost all circumstances, that habitat should be designated whenever the services 
determine that a species is threatened or endangered.  Under ESA section 4, the services, “to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable, shall… designate” critical habitat, and “may, from 
time-to-time thereafter as appropriate, revise such designation.”59   For years, the services 
observed that mandate largely in the breach.60  But judicial decisions have consistently 
compelled designations, and the services are slowly catching up.61  Over 600 species now have 
designated critical habitat, and the percentage of species with designated habitat is gradually 
rising.62 
In practice, the designations generally describe particular geographic areas, though they 
may also describe certain landscape features that lead to inclusion in or exclusion from the 
                                                
56 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (2006).  The ESA defines “conservation” in terms of recovery, and critical habitat 
therefore is habitat with features that make it essential to species’ survival or recovery. 
57 Id. § 1532(5)(C). 
58 Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
59 Id. § 1533(a)(3).  In an approach that departs from much of the rest of the ESA, the services must 
consider economic impact when designating critical habitat.  Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
60 See Sinden, supra note 53, at 157-59. 
61 See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 
2004); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1283 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2001); 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2001). 
62 For a list of species with designated critical habitat, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Listed Species 
with Critical Habitat, at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/CriticalHabitat.do?nmfs=1 (last checked December 15, 
2010).  A full list of protected species is available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/species/us-species.html (last 
checked December 15, 2010).  As of February 26, 2011, 603 of the 1,371 listed U.S. species have designated critical 
habitat. 
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designated area.63  Millions of acres of habitat have now been designated, and in some parts of 
the country, swaths of critical habitat cover much of the map.64   
  2.  Procedural and substantive protections 
The actual protection of those millions of acres of critical habitat derives from ESA 
section 7.65  Substantively, section 7 limits the ability of federal agencies to undertake, fund, or 
permit actions that degrade critical habitat.  It directs those agencies to “insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency… is not likely to… result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after 
consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.”66  In practice, this provision is 
often simply referred to as the “adverse modification prohibition.”   
Procedurally, section 7 requires federal agencies taking actions (“action agencies,” in 
ESA-speak) that might adversely affect listed species to “consult” with the relevant service67 and 
obtain a written report known as a “biological opinion.”  The biological opinion expresses the 
service’s opinion about whether the project will “jeopardize” the survival of listed species (a 
concept explained in more detail below) or will result in adverse modification.68  If the service 
concludes that adverse modification is likely to result from the project, its biological opinion 
should identify “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that could be implemented without causing 
adverse modification or jeopardy.69  Once the action agency has received a biological opinion, it 
                                                
63 See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) in the United States, 75 
Fed. Reg. 76086 , 76119 (Dec. 7, 2010) (excluding “manmade structures on all types of land ownership”). 
64 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Critical Habitat Portal, at http://crithab.fws.gov/.  The link accesses 
an on-line mapping tool.  Total figures are hard to find, but the critical habitat for polar bears alone encompasses 
187,157 square miles.  U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Polar Bear Critical Habitat: Some Frequently Asked Questions 
(2010) at http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/pdf/critical_habitat_factsheet_11_2010.pdf. 
65 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006). 
66 Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
67 With some exceptions, NMFS holds jurisdiction over marine and anadromous fish species and FWS 
holds jurisdiction over terrestrial and freshwater species. 
68 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006). 
69 Id. § 1536(b)(4). 
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theoretically holds discretion to follow or disregard the opinion’s recommendations.70  But in 
practice, action agencies hardly ever proceed with an action that the services predict will cause 
adverse modification or jeopardy.71  
This “formal consultation” process is usually preceded by and often intertwined with a 
more informal process in which the action agency and the services negotiate changes to the 
project.72  Those discussions can result in a variety of outcomes.  First, the services often concur 
that a project will not adversely affect listed species or their critical habitat, in which case the 
project may simply proceed.73  Conversely, the action agency might decide that the impact on 
species will be too large and unavoidable and might walk away from the project.  It might also 
significantly modify the project, and those changes can result in a new project description or in 
the inclusion in the biological opinion of “conservation measures,” which are binding conditions 
that the action agency must implement for the opinion to remain valid.74   The services might 
also determine that a project will not lead to jeopardy or adverse modification but nevertheless 
may find that it will “take” listed species.75  The services then will usually impose conditions—
known in ESA parlance as “reasonable and prudent measures”—designed to reduce the level of 
take.76    Finally, the biological opinion may also include “conservation recommendations,” 
which are non-binding measures that would minimize harm to species or promote their 
recovery.77  The jumble of terms and acronyms is bewildering, but in summary, there are many 
ways that consultation can change a project and minimize its negative impacts on habitat. 
                                                
70 50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a). 
71 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997). 
72 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES 
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 3-1 (1998). 
73 Id. at 3-1. 
74 See id. at xii. 
75 Id. at 4-45 to 4-52.  For discussion of the ESA’s “take” prohibition, see infra part II.C. 
76 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2006); CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-52 to 4-54. 
77 See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at xii. 
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Every year, thousands of actions are subject to this consultation process.  Section 7 
applies only to federal agencies, and therefore purely state, local, or private actions do not 
require consultation.78  But many of the governmental and private actions that affect species 
habitat involve federal funding or permits,79 and the federal government itself also carries out 
hundreds of species-affecting projects every year.80    
B.  The Jeopardy Prohibition 
In addition to its adverse modification prohibition, section 7 also precludes federal 
agencies from taking actions “likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of any listed 
species.81  This prohibition is implemented through the same consultation process, and biological 
opinions always state whether or not the project is likely to cause jeopardy.82  The jeopardy 
analysis should encompass any threat a project poses to listed species, including but not limited 
to habitat degradation, and in practice most jeopardy analyses include extensive discussion of the 
action’s potential habitat effects.83 
The jeopardy prohibition has received much more attention than the prohibition on 
adverse modification.  Some academic analyses of ESA section 7 focus entirely on jeopardy;84 
practicing attorneys often just refer to section 7 as “the jeopardy prohibition,” as though the 
adverse modification prohibition did not exist; and, as discussed in more detail below, the 
                                                
78 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (imposing obligations on “[e]ach federal agency”). 
79 For example, many development projects require dredge and fill permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, and many transportation projects depend on federal funding. 
80 See infra Part IV (discussing the large number of consultations for fish species alone). 
81 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
82 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-33 to 4-34. 
83 With the exception of biological opinions for ocean fishing activities, the jeopardy analysis in every 
biological opinion I reviewed included discussion, usually extensive, of habitat impacts. 
84 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 54, at 42-49 (focusing on jeopardy while analyzing section 7’s role in 
responding to climate change). 
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services have often asserted that the jeopardy prohibition obviates the need for regulatory 
protection of critical habitat.85 
 C.  The Take Prohibition 
The ESA’s other major substantive prohibition comes from section 9, which makes it 
unlawful for “any person” to “take” any endangered species.86  The act defines “take” broadly.  
In addition to actions like hunting animals, the definition includes actions that “harm” listed 
species,87 and the Supreme Court has upheld agency regulations that treat some forms of habitat 
modification as prohibited “takes.”88  Consequently, as with the jeopardy prohibition, a key part 
of the take prohibition’s role is to protect habitat. 
Though far-reaching, the take prohibition is not absolute.  Private parties may obtain 
“incidental take permits” if they prepare “habitat conservation plans” that meet the requirements 
of ESA section 10.89  Those habitat conservation plans generally include measures to minimize 
and compensate for the expected take.90  Federal agencies (and recipients of permits or funding 
from federal agencies) also may obtain “incidental take authorization” if they complete the 
section 7 consultation process and implement the “reasonable and prudent measures” specified in 
a biological opinion.91  But even with those potential exceptions, the take prohibition is generally 
viewed as a key part of the substantive core of the ESA.92 
 D.  The Combination of Approaches 
                                                
85 See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.  See also Barton H. Thompson, People or Prairie 
Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (“critical habitat plays only 
a secondary role”). 
86 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006).  By regulation, the services have extended these protections to many 
threatened species.   
87 Id. § 1532(19). 
88 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
89 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of 
Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999). 
90 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
91 Id. § 1536(b)(4). 
92 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 
428 (4th ed. 2010). 
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Within this suite of protections, the adverse modification prohibition occupies an 
interesting—and hotly debated—niche.  Without question, its protections are partly redundant, 
for some habitat modification will be precluded by the jeopardy prohibition, the take prohibition, 
or both.  For many years, the official position of the services was that the adverse modification 
protections were completely redundant, a position with which some commentators concurred.93 
But the plain language of the statute indicates, and some other commentators and courts have 
agreed, that the critical habitat provisions are not entirely redundant, and that for many federal 
agency actions they should hold independent significance.94 
The potential for overlap is obvious.  If a federal agency action is likely to cause major 
negative impacts to listed species, the jeopardy prohibition should apply, and the critical habitat 
provisions will just offer an overlapping layer of protection.  The controversy at issue in 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court’s first seminal ESA case, provides a good 
example. 95  There, the TVA proposed to operate a dam expected to obliterate all known habitat, 
including all designated critical habitat, of the snail darter, a listed species.96  Such an action was 
clearly likely to cause both adverse modification and jeopardy.  Similarly, if an action will lead 
to clear and discernible impacts to identifiable animals, the take prohibition should apply,97 and 
the critical habitat protections again just offer a redundant layer of protection.  TVA v. Hill 
provides an example here as well; the killing of all known members of a species would clearly 
constitute a prohibited set of takes.  Nevertheless, there would appear, at least on paper, to be 
                                                
93 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
94 See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text. 
95 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
96 The dam eventually was built, and “[t]o everyone’s surprise, the snail darter did not go extinct.”  Holly 
Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 
109, 134 (Richard J. Lazarus and Oliver O. Houck eds. 2005). 
97 See supra notes 86-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
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circumstances in which the adverse modification prohibition would apply but the jeopardy and 
take prohibitions would not.98 
  1.  Adverse modification and jeopardy 
The adverse modification prohibition appears to go beyond the jeopardy prohibition in 
two categories of actions.99   
First, some federal actions may adversely modify habitat but not cause enough harm to 
create a likelihood of jeopardy.  The services have consistently asserted that even after a species 
has been listed, it is generally possible to cause additional harm to the species without pushing it 
over the brink into jeopardy.100  At least in some circumstances, this is a plausible statutory 
interpretation.101  The adverse modification prohibition, by contrast, is more absolute.  The 
statute does not define the phrase, but its meaning should be clear.  “Adverse,” in common 
parlance, means against or for the worse,102 and modification, according to Black’s Law 
Dictionary, means “a change to something.”103  No size modifiers accompany the phrase 
“adverse modification;” the ESA does not use “major,” “significant,” or any other analogous 
phrase, notwithstanding those words’ prominent appearances in other contemporaneously-
                                                
98 But see infra Part IV (discussing the services’ apparent determination that these circumstances do not 
actually exist). 
99 For a parallel analysis of the relationship between jeopardy and adverse modification, see Houck, supra 
note 24, at 300-01. 
100 See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-36 (explaining that not all adverse effects will rise 
to the level of causing jeopardy); Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a Game 
Protected Species Can’t Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 141-42 (2001) (describing the services’ willingness to 
allocate the “buffer” of tolerable harm ). 
101 If a species’ population is stable or improving, it could absorb some harm from individual actions 
without its continued existence being jeopardized. 
102 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004) (defining adverse: “1. Against; opposed (to). 2. Having 
an opposing or contrary interest, concern, or position. 3. Contrary (to) or in opposition (to). 4. Hostile”).  
103 Id. (“1. A change to something; an alteration … 2. A qualification or limitation of something…”). 
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drafted environmental laws.104  The plain language therefore precludes federal agency actions 
from causing negative changes to critical habitat, even if the change is small.105 
Second, some federal actions will adversely modify habitat but will have uncertain 
impacts upon species’ survival.  Uncertainty pervades implementation of the ESA.106  The 
services do not always know the extent to which a proposed action will affect a species’ 
viability.  Often they are also uncertain about species’ status and population trend. 107   
Consequently, determining whether an individual project might pose enough risk to create 
jeopardy can be quite difficult.  Yet the services may still know that the action will adversely 
affect the species’ habitat.  Determining whether a single clearcut in spotted owl critical habitat 
will tip spotted owls into a state of jeopardy may be very difficult, for example, but discerning 
whether the clearcut will have adverse impacts on critical habitat ought to be much easier. 
To say that these interpretations are compelled by statutory language is not to say that 
they have been adopted by the services.  In joint regulations promulgated in the 1980s, the 
services defined “adverse modification” not as any adverse change to designated critical habitat, 
but instead as “a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical 
habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”108  That definition, as numerous 
commentators and judicial opinions have pointed out, narrows the definition of adverse 
modification and gives the green light to actions that might limit recovery without appreciably 
                                                
104 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requiring environmental impact statements for “major” federal 
actions “significantly” impacting the environment). 
105 See Rodgers, supra note 7, at 170 (“Backing the tractor over a single salmon redd is an actionable deed 
of “destruction” or “modification” if the necessary paperwork is done.”). 
106 See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, BD. ON ENVTL. STUDIES & 
TOXICOLOGY, COMM’N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT 143-54 (1995); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s “Best 
Available Science” Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 438 (2004) (“Uncertainty is endemic in the ESA context.”). 
107 See Teresa Woods and Steve Morey, Uncertainty and the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 529, 
531-33 (2007). 
108 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
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reducing the species’ odds of survival.109  In their joint consultation handbook, the services 
stretched that regulatory definition a step further.  “Modification or destruction of designated 
critical habitat that does not reach” the “appreciable” threshold, they claimed, should not count 
as adverse modification, and “is not prohibited by section 7.”110  The agencies also defined the 
phrase “appreciably diminish” to mean “considerably reduce.”111  All of these words contain a 
somewhat deliberate vagueness, but the services apparently intended to create an exception for 
small-scale modification or destruction of habitat—an exception that appears nowhere in the text 
of the statute itself.  On the basis of these definitions, the agencies then asserted, and some 
commentators agreed, that the critical habitat protections were redundant.112 
But these definitions no longer hold any legal force.  Environmental groups repeatedly 
challenged the regulatory definition of adverse modification, arguing that it was inconsistent 
with the statute, and they repeatedly won.113  In December 2004, in response to these decisions, 
FWS directed its staff to ignore the regulations and rely on statutory text alone.114  NMFS soon 
issued a similar memorandum.115  The regulations have not been withdrawn or replaced, but the 
biological opinions of both services now routinely disclaim any reliance on the regulatory 
                                                
109 See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 53, at 153-57; Houck, supra note 24, at 297, 300-01. 
110 Id at 4-35. 
111 Id. at 4-36 to 4-37. 
112 See supra note 27. 
113 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2004); 
N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1283 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2001); Sierra 
Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2001). 
114 Memorandum from Marshall Jones, Acting Director, to Regional Directors, Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 
7 Manager, California-Nevada Operations Office, Dec. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/pdf/AdverseModGuidance.pdf.  
115 William T. Hogarth, Ph.D., Memorandum to Regional Administrators, Office of Protected Resources, 
Re: Application of the “Destruction or Adverse Modification” Standard under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered 
Species Act, Nov. 7, 2005.  
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definitions.116  The services therefore are back, at least in theory, to the statutory text, and that 
text gives the jeopardy and adverse modification prohibitions independent roles. 
 2.  Take and adverse modification 
The take prohibition also overlaps significantly, but not completely, with the ESA’s 
prohibition on adverse modification.  Many actions that modify habitat also directly take listed 
species.  A timber sale or a dam project, for example, will have significant adverse impacts on 
habitat and is also likely to directly kill or harm members of species inhabiting the area.  But, as 
the Supreme Court’s Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt 
decision points out, not every habitat modification will result in take.117  In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Stevens stressed that the take prohibition applies only to actions that “actually kill 
or injure wildlife.” 118 Justice O’Connor elaborated on this point, saying that her concurrence was 
“predicated on [her] understanding that the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat 
modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to 
identifiable protected animals.”119  She later cited an example that clearly demonstrates her 
understanding of the outer boundaries of the take prohibition.  In dissent, Justice Scalia had 
raised the specter of section 9 applying to “a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that 
makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby injures protected fish.”120  
Under any reasonable definition of the term, that farmer would be adversely modifying critical 
habitat if the river were so designated; his actions would cause a change, and that change would 
                                                
116 See, e.g. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NEW MEXICO ECOLOGICAL SERVICES FIELD OFFICE, 
BIOLOGICAL OPINION: BUCKMAN WATER DIVERSION PROJECT 1 (2007) (hereinafter BUCKMAN DIVERSION 
BIOLOGICAL OPINION) (“This biological opinion does not rely on the regulatory definition of ‘destruction or adverse 
modification’ of critical habitat at 50 CFR 402.02. Instead, we have relied upon the statute and the [Gifford Pinchot 
Task Force decision]… .”). 
117 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
118 Id. at 690, 700 n.13 (quoting the services’ joint regulations). 
119 Id. at 708-09.  Justice O’Connor was not the deciding vote in the case, so her concurrence has no 
precedential authority.  But it does suggest how other courts might interpret the boundaries of the take prohibition. 
120 Id. at 719. 
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be for the worse. 121  But according to Justice O’Connor, the farmer would not be causing a take, 
presumably because the causal chain between his action and harm to identifiable individual fish 
would be too attenuated or too difficult to discern.122 
Sweet Home suggests two categories of actions that would trigger the adverse 
modification prohibition but that would not be prohibited as takes.123  First, actions that 
adversely affect currently-unoccupied habitat are highly unlikely to cause a take but could 
qualify as prohibited adverse modifications.  Second, actions that adversely affect habitat but 
have uncertain causal connections to harm to identifiable animals could fall solely under the 
adverse modification prohibition.  In all likelihood, the latter class of actions, and perhaps also 
the former, also would fail to trigger the jeopardy prohibition, and the adverse modification 
prohibition alone would provide protection. 
                                                
121 That adverse modification would not be prohibited, however, unless the farmer needed a federal permit 
or funding for his actions. 
122 515 U.S. at 713. 
123 See also Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1238 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“mere habitat degradation is not always sufficient to equal harm”). 
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Figure 1: The ESA’s Prohibitions 
This diagram shows types of actions to which each of the ESA’s regulatory prohibitions would apply.  It also 
illustrates areas of potential overlap and, based on the plain language of the statute, unique application. 
 
At first blush, these categories of actions to which the adverse modification provision alone 
applies might seem trivial.124  In actuality, they are probably enormous.125  Two examples 
illustrate their potential scope. 
 The first is climate change.  Scientists know that every action that increases greenhouse 
gas emissions contributes to climate change,126 and they know that climate change is a primary 
threat to polar bear habitat (and habitat for thousands of other species).127 They cannot possibly 
                                                
124 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 85, at 1141 (explaining why the critical habitat provisions rarely 
assume independent significance). 
125 See generally Odum, supra note 10, at 728 (“Each threatened and endangered species, with a few 
exceptions, owes its special status to series of small decisions.”). 
126 Carbon dioxide and several other major greenhouse gases are long-lasting and well-mixed, which means 
that global emissions become blended together.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 138-39 (2007).  The extent of climate change therefore is largely a 
function of global aggregate emissions, and any emissions that add to that aggregate level influence the extent of 
change. 
127 See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 
Fed. Reg. 28212, 28292-93 (May 15, 2008); IPCC, supra note 126, at 11 (summarizing threats to species generally). 
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say, however, which coal-fired power plant will kill which individual bears or what increment of 
harm that new plant will cause, for all global emissions become mixed, and one can no more 
explain which puffs of carbon dioxide will kill bears than one can identify a particular vote that 
won a national election.128  Scientists therefore know that greenhouse gas-emitting projects are 
adversely affecting critical habitat, but it is much harder to say that those projects are 
jeopardizing specific species or taking identifiable individual animals.  Consequently, the critical 
habitat provisions alone would seem to apply to the many federal actions authorizing, permitting, 
or directly causing increases in greenhouse gas emissions. 
 A second example involves the water quality impacts of urbanization.  Many scientific 
studies have documented a negative causal relationship between urban development and water 
quality degradation, particularly in small urban watersheds.129  The problem is caused not just by 
development adjacent to or in the waterway, but also by the increasing extent of impervious 
surfaces throughout the watershed, for every new development increases pollutant loading, alters 
flow patterns, and helps change the configuration of the stream.130  Assigning a specific 
increment of stream degradation to one project is likely to be impossible, for stream health 
usually reflects the intertwined influence of many stressors,131 and attributing jeopardy or a take 
to a particular development project would be quite difficult.  But scientists can say with 
confidence that each new road, mall, or subdivision degrades aquatic habitat.132  If that habitat is 
                                                
128 See Ruhl, supra note 54, at 17-23.   
129 See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 COLO. L. REV. __ 
(2011) (summarizing this research). 
130 See Christopher J. Walsh et al., The Urban Stream Syndrome: Current Knowledge and the Search for a 
Cure, 24 J. N. AM. BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 706, 707–08 (2005); CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROTECTION, IMPACTS OF 
IMPERVIOUS COVER ON AQUATIC SYSTEMS (2003). 
131 See Owen, supra note 129, at __, __. 
132 See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER POLLUTION, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, URBAN STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 207 (2009) (“there is a near-
universal negative association between biological assemblages in streams and increasing urbanization”). 
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designated as critical—and in some parts of the country, thousands of stream miles in urbanizing 
areas are so designated133—the adverse modification prohibition again should apply. 
For some of the most extensive threats to species habitat, then, the adverse modification 
prohibition seems to be the ESA’s primary answer.  Indeed, because of this unique role, and 
because of the pervasive challenges of incremental environmental degradation, it looks like one 
of the most powerful and important levers in all of environmental law. 
 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
While in theory the critical habitat provisions should be very important, practice and 
theory can diverge.  To gain a better sense of how FWS and NMFS actually implement the 
critical habitat provision, I pursued a series of inquiries.  Those inquiries focused on several of 
the key points at which the critical habitat protections might exert some effect. 
One key decision point is the consulting service’s determination about whether or not a 
project will cause adverse modification or jeopardy.  To track those outcomes, I reviewed 
almost134 all biological opinions prepared for threatened or endangered fish species between 
2005 and 2009.135  That group included 4,048 opinions.136  For each opinion, I tracked the 
                                                
133 See Critical Habitat Portal, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (showing designated habitat).  
Much of the designated habitat includes stream corridors in developing areas.   
134 Some opinions were available on line, and the rest I obtained through Freedom of Information Act 
requests.  The Sacramento field office of the Fish and Wildlife Service was unable to locate nineteen biological 
opinions.  Several field offices in FWS’ Mountain/Prairie region chose to fill out a results table rather than directly 
providing documents.  The results for those Mountain/Prairie region biological opinions are included in the study, 
but I have not seen the original documents.  I also eliminated a few biological opinions for which the pdf files were 
incomplete. 
135 I limited the inquiry to fish species in an attempt to narrow the number of biological opinions.  The five-
year period post-dates the services’ abandonment of the legally flawed regulatory definition of adverse modification.  
It also had the incidental benefit of including more electronically-available documents. 
136 NMFS issued 2,963 of the opinions and the Fish and Wildlife Service issued 1,085.  Many biological 
opinion documents address more than one species, and some of those documents find jeopardy or adverse 
modification for some species but not others.  In determining this overall number, and in performing the calculations 
described below, I counted each species-specific opinion as an independent biological opinion.  Thus, if a single 
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project type, action agency, species affected, jeopardy determination, adverse modification 
determination, whether critical habitat had been designated for the species, and, if critical habitat 
had been designated, whether the action area137 included designated critical habitat. 
 Because of the large pool of biological opinions, this initial review was necessarily 
limited to tracking a few specific parameters.  To zero in on potential effects, I then looked more 
closely at three sets of biological opinions.  The sets collectively contained 138 biological 
opinions.  I began with coho salmon, a species with four separately-listed “evolutionarily 
significant units.”138  During the study period, three of those units had designated critical habitat 
and the fourth did not.139  For each biological opinion, I recorded whether the services predicted 
a net positive, negative, or neutral or unclear impact on the species’ habitat;140 whether NMFS 
anticipated take, and, if so, whether habitat modification was a predicted cause of take; and 
whether NMFS found jeopardy or adverse modification.  I also performed a qualitative review of 
the conditions NMFS imposed upon the projects.141   I then completed similar comparisons for 
two other species sets: first, Rio Grande silvery minnow and Gila topminnow; and then all fish 
species under the jurisdiction of the FWS’s Oregon field office.142  The former two species, 
                                                                                                                                                       
document addressed one project’s impacts on four different listed species, I counted that document as four biological 
opinions. 
137 The services define the “action area” as the area affected by an action.  It can be larger than the project 
footprint.  See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-17. 
138 See Northwest Regional Office, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service, Coho Salmon 
(Oncorhynchus kisutch), at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Salmon-Populations/Coho/ (last 
checked January 16, 2011).  To avoid attributing to coho protection measures that were designed primarily to benefit 
other species, I eliminated biological opinions that also included consultations on other listed species. 
139 Id.  
140 Some biological opinions expressed conclusions on this question, and in others the expected effect was 
obvious from the analysis.  If the expected net effect was not obvious or was ambiguously described, I treated the 
aggregate effect as neutral or uncertain. 
141 While reviewing the biological opinions, I tracked the number of RPMs imposed.  But for several 
reasons, I decided these numbers were not meaningful.  First, an RPM is just one of the many ways in which 
consultation can lead to changes in projects, see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text, and a small number of 
RPMs may just indicate that other approaches were instead being used.  Second, the number of RPMs may not 
correspond with their stringency.  A single, simple prohibition may sometimes be more protective than a complex 
set of mitigation measures.   
142 I selected Oregon because the state has several fish species with critical habitat and several without. 
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though handled by different FWS field offices, have somewhat similar biological needs and face 
somewhat similar threats, but the Rio Grande silvery minnow has designated critical habitat 
while the Gila topminnow does not.143  The latter group includes species both with and without 
critical habitat, all of them addressed by one field office.  My goal, again, was to assess whether 
critical habitat designations correlated with any difference in the services’ approaches to habitat 
protection. 
 Because all consultation processes occur in the shadow of judicial review, I also reviewed 
cases.  The set of cases addressing the adverse modification prohibition is still surprisingly small, 
given the ESA’s reputation as a spawning ground for litigation, and I reviewed all cases, both 
published and unpublished, available on Lexis or Westlaw.144 
Finally, because I suspected that the paper record would tell only a partial story, I 
interviewed FWS and NMFS staff.145  The interviewees were all biologists, most with some level 
of supervisory responsibility over biological opinion preparation.  All were career staff rather 
than political appointees.  All of the interviews were semi-structured.146  I promised anonymity 
to all interviewees. 
Because critical habitat is a rather controversial subject, a few words are in order about 
what I did not do.  This study does not directly assess how action agencies and private 
                                                
143 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Species Profile, Rio Grande Silvery minnow (Hybognathus amarus), at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=E07I#crithab (last checked January 11, 
2011); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Species Profile, Gila topminnow (Poeciliopsis occidentalis), at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=E00C.    Both species primarily inhabit 
backwater and sidechannel habitats within desert river systems, and both are threatened by dewatering of rivers, 
increasing pollution levels, and changes in river channel structure.  See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
BIOLOGICAL OPINION: ONGOING GRAZING FOR THREE ALLOTMENTS ON THE TONTO NATIONAL FOREST 10 (2009) 
(describing Gila topminnow habitat needs and threats); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON 
THE EFFECTS OF THE TIFFANY SEDIMENT PLUG REMOVAL 7-8, 11-12 (2005) (describing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow 
habitat needs and threats to that habitat). 
144 See infra Part IV.C (discussing twenty cases). 
145 Most interviews were by telephone, but several biologists responded by email.  One biologist distributed 
the questions to all field offices in her region and then sent me a compilation of their answers, which we then 
discussed in a telephone call. 
146 My standard questions appear in Table 2. 
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landowners respond to critical habitat designations.  I did ask agency staff about their 
perceptions of the reactions of regulated parties, but my focus was on the implementation of the 
provisions by the services and on review of that implementation by the courts.  This study 
therefore is not, and should not be interpreted as, a definitive study of the effects of critical 
habitat designations, though its results should assist anyone pursuing such an inquiry. 
 
IV.  RESULTS: THE PROHIBITION IN PRACTICE 
 A.  Jeopardy and Adverse Modification Determinations 
The final product of a formal consultation process is a biological opinion, and the crux of 
a biological opinion is its determination about whether the proposed action is likely to adversely 
modify critical habitat or to jeopardize listed species.  One key focus of my analysis therefore 
was on the frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations.   
On this question, I was not exploring uncharted waters.  While no past study has 
attempted to isolate the effect of critical habitat designations upon these outcomes, several have 
reviewed the frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations.147  All of these 
studies have found that both jeopardy and adverse modification determinations are quite rare.  
The primary reason is straightforward: the action agency and the consulting agency have many 
opportunities to revise the proposed action and avoid a jeopardy or adverse modification 
determination, and they usually take advantage of these opportunities.148  Who accommodates 
                                                
147 Houck, note 24, at 319-20; DAVID HOSKINS ET AL., FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS 
CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1994); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBERS OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 31-32 (1992) 
(“over 90 percent of the biological opinions issued by FWS/NMFS during the past 5 fiscal years have found that the 
proposed action would not likely place a listed species in jeopardy”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED 
SPECIES: LIMITED EFFECT OF CONSULTATION REQUIREMENTS ON WESTERN WATER PROJECTS (1987). 
148 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE FEDERAL MANAGEMENT ATTENTION 
IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 19-20 (2004) (describing measures taken by the agencies to 
increase collaboration and avoid conflict during consultation processes).  One biologist told me that the services 
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whom in those negotiations is a more difficult question to answer; some studies assert that the 
rarity of jeopardy or adverse modification decisions represents conflict avoidance primarily on 
the part of the services,149 but there also is evidence that action agencies will go to great lengths 
to avoid a jeopardy determination.150  Either way, the past studies do demonstrate that some 
accommodation usually occurs. 
Like the prior studies, I found that jeopardy and adverse modification determinations are 
rare.  Within the set of biological opinions that I reviewed, the FWS found jeopardy 7.2% of the 
time and adverse modification for 6.6% of eligible opinions.151  Those numbers include the 
opinions of a Utah field office that from 2005 through November, 2008 issued jeopardy and 
adverse modifications with anomalous frequency.  With the Utah opinions eliminated, the 
percentages are 2.4% and 0.083%.  For NMFS, the percentages were lower: 0.54% for jeopardy 
and 0.53% for adverse modification.  Interestingly, the percentages were different under the 
Bush and Obama administrations.  From January 20, 2009 through the end of that year, neither 
FWS nor NMFS issued a single jeopardy or adverse modification decision for any fish 
species.152  These results suggest subtle differences between agencies and administrations,153 but 
                                                                                                                                                       
occasionally send draft jeopardy/adverse modification opinions to action agencies.  Action agencies usually respond 
to these draft jeopardy/adverse modification opinions by changing the project, removing the need for a jeopardy or 
adverse modification determination.  NMFS Biologist Interview, Nov. 16, 2010. 
149 Houck, supra note 24, at 319-21.    
150 See GAO, supra note 148, at 49 (“action agencies typically do quite a bit to avoid getting such an 
opinion”). 
151 By eligible opinions I mean opinions for species that actually have designated critical habitat. 
152 I do not know why this difference exists.  Possible explanations are that the Obama Administration has 
discouraged jeopardy and adverse modification opinions even more than the Bush Administration did, that the 
Obama Administration has encouraged action agencies to propose fewer harmful actions or to be more 
accommodating of proposed changes, or that the Obama Administration is better at resolving interagency conflict. 
153 The differences between NMFS and FWS in the frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification 
findings are both significant at the 99% level (for jeopardy: Pearson chi-square: 155.232, degrees of freedom: 1, 
P=0.000; for adverse modification Pearson chi-square: 97.575, degrees of freedom: 1, P=0.000).  The differences 
between NMFS and FWS in the Bush and Obama Administration are not significant at the 95% level but are 
significant at the 90% level (for jeopardy: Pearson chi-square: 3.709, degrees of freedom: 1, P=0.054; for adverse 
modification: Pearson chi-square: 3.714, degrees of freedom: 1, P=0.054).  In other words, one can say with 90% 
confidence that the Obama Administration is less likely to find adverse modification or jeopardy than the Bush 
Administration. 
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the essential point is that for both agencies and administrations, jeopardy and adverse 
modification determinations are rare. 
Table 1: Frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations 
 NMFS 
(2962 opinions total) 
FWS 
(1085 opinions total; 786 non-Utah opinions) 
 Total Bush 
Admin. 
Obama 
Admin. 
Total Bush 
Admin. 
Obama 
Admin. 
Frequency of J 
determinations 
7.2% 8.5% 0% 
w/o Utah 
0.54% 0.66% 0% 
2.4% 2.9% 0% 
Frequency of AM 
determinations 
6.6% 8.2% 0% 
w/o Utah 
0.53% 0.68% 0% 
0.083% 1.0% 0% 
# AM determinations 
w/o jeopardy 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jeopardy percentage 
for species w/o CH 
0.13% 0.15% 0% 3.7% 4% 0% 
Jeopardy percentage 
for species w/ CH 
7.9% 11% 0% 
w/o Utah 
0.68% 0.87% 0% 
3.2% 3.9% 0% 
 
I also evaluated how frequently an adverse modification determination played an 
independent role in a negative biological opinion.  As discussed above, the plain language of the 
statute suggests that the adverse modification prohibition would often have independent effect, 
for the set of federal actions that adversely affect habitat without clearly jeopardizing species 
would seem to be quite large.154  And following the Gifford Pinchot Task Force decision,155 the 
services have consistently claimed they are ignoring their regulatory definition of adverse 
modification—a definition that seemed to allow some incremental degradation—and focusing 
solely on the statutory language.156  But my data set did not include a single opinion in which 
either NMFS or FWS found jeopardy without finding adverse modification.  Instead, the 
agencies have treated the class of actions that adversely modifies habitat without also causing 
jeopardy as a null set.   
                                                
154 See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text. 
155 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2004). 
156 See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text. 
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 One might hypothesize that perhaps the services were reluctant to let adverse 
modification findings stand on their own, and therefore added jeopardy determinations when 
they were already leaning toward adverse modification findings.  There is some statistical 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis.157  NMFS did find jeopardy more frequently for species 
with designated critical habitat, and the difference, while not significant at the traditional 95% 
level, is significant at a 90% level.158  In interviews, a few biologists thought such an effect was 
possible, whether because a critical habitat designation increased focus on habitat needs or 
because the opinions’ authors were reluctant to try to explain an adverse modification finding 
without an accompanying jeopardy finding.159  But other biologists expected no such effect, and 
neither the interviews nor the statistics suggest that the effect, if it does exist, is anything more 
than a subtle influence potentially changing a tiny percentage of outcomes.160   
Closer examination of the subsets of opinions confirmed that critical habitat designations 
had little effect on regulatory outcomes.  In forty-four of the 138 opinions, the proposed action 
was expected to have net adverse effects on habitat.161  Some of the anticipated habitat effects 
seemed substantial and others minor, but by at least one key measure, almost all were 
meaningful and discernable: in over eighty percent of these opinions, the service determined that 
the habitat alteration would cause or contribute to “take” of the relevant listed species.162  Yet not 
                                                
157 Critical habitat also may be designated more often for species in greater danger of extinction, and the 
increased frequency of jeopardy determinations might reflect the gravity of threats rather than an independent effect 
of critical habitat designations. 
158 For the FWS, there is no statistical evidence supporting this hypothesis.  With Utah opinions eliminated 
from the analysis, the jeopardy percentages for species with and without critical habitat are almost the same.  See 
Table 1, supra. 
159 See infra Table 3. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Several of the remaining opinions were unclear about whether habitat modification would contribute to 
the take. 
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one of these opinions found that the project would cause jeopardy or adverse modification, and 
the presence or absence of a critical habitat designation had no apparent effect upon the outcome.   
Table 2: Frequency of jeopardy, adverse modification, and take findings for selected subsets of biological opinions 
 
Species 
group 
Total # 
opinions 
Percent 
predicting 
positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
/uncertain 
habitat trends 
J findings AM findings Percent (for 
opinions predicting 
negative habitat 
trend and for all 
opinions) finding 
take partly or 
entirely due to 
habitat 
modification 
Percent imposing 
reasonable and 
prudent measures 
Coho (CH) 47 32% + 
36%  - 
32%  ? 
 
0 
 
0 
94% -  
 
94% overall 
 
96% 
 
Coho (no 
CH) 
13 46% + 
23% - 
31% =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
100% - 
 
80% overall 
 
92% 
 
Rio Grande 
silvery 
minnow 
(CH) 
18 56% + 
39% -  
6% =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
14% - 
 
56% overall 
 
100% 
 
Gila 
topminnow 
(no CH) 
9 44% + 
22% - 
33% =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
100% - 
 
89% overall 
 
89% 
 
Oregon (CH) 18 56% + 
39% -  
6% =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
100% - 
 
94% overall 
 
100% 
 
Oregon (no 
CH) 
29 48% + 
28% -  
24% =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
87.5%-* 
 
66% overall 
 
100% 
 
Oregon 
(mixed) 
4 75% + 
0% - 
25% ? 
 
0 
 
0 
100% - 
 
75% overall 
 
100% 
 
All non-CH 
opinions 
51 47% + 
25.5% - 
27.5%  =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
92% -* 
 
69% overall 
 
90% 
 
All CH 
opinions 
83 42% +  
37% -  
20% =/? 
 
0 
 
0 
81% - 
 
86% overall 
 
98% 
 
 
Nor could I discern any important difference in the method of analysis.  Some differences do 
appear; biological opinions for projects affecting critical habitat do always include paragraphs 
discussing those effects, and in the pool of opinions I reviewed closely, they also always 
included a finding of no adverse modification.  But jeopardy discussions also consistently 
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addressed habitat, and the adverse modification analyses often seemed like derivative 
appendages to the jeopardy analyses.  That appearance is entirely consistent with what one 
biologist described as a prevailing attitude toward these analyses: “it’s like, oh, we have to do the 
adverse mod… it’s just another thing we have to do.”163   
The opinions also indicate why the agencies were never finding adverse modification, 
even where projects clearly would adversely affect designated critical habitat and the effects 
were of sufficient scale to harm or even kill individual animals.  Quite simply, the services do 
not construe the adverse modification prohibition as applying to minor alterations to habitat.  
And in the 138 opinions I closely reviewed, all negative alterations were described—sometimes 
convincingly, sometimes not164—as minor.  The biological opinions offered a variety of 
justifications for these conclusions, but all essentially amount to the claim that the project would 
only affect a small portion of the species’ critical habitat, and therefore, in the grand scheme of 
things, would not really matter.165  Sometimes the biological opinions offered that rationale 
                                                
163 FWS Biologist Interview, January 26, 2010. 
164 See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: CURRY 
COUNTY ROADS DEPARTMENT AND RINGER GRAVEL MINING IN HUNTER CREEK 14-20 (2005) (finding no adverse 
modification despite concluding that a project would “alter approximately 2,450 feet of streambank… used by 
juvenile coho salmon as rearing habitat;” would result in “reduction in production of desirable macroinvertebrate 
species in 1,500 feet of stream and a reduction in desirable prey to rearing SONC coho salmon juveniles”); 
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS 
GRAVEL MINING, ROGUE RIVER ESTUARY 12 (2006) (finding no adverse modification for a project that “will 
decrease habitat suitability and likely result in reduced use of these two acres of the river by coho salmon. The 
project will disrupt the normal behavior patterns of individuals that would use these areas, and will delay the 
recovery of the habitat characteristics important for high water refuge.”); BUCKMAN DIVERSION BIOLOGICAL 
OPINION, supra  note 116, at 42-43 (2007) (finding no adverse modification for a water project that would reduce 
flows in the Rio Grande).  The opinion noted that  
[t]his reduction in flows contributes to an increased risk of river drying (either in timing of a 
drying event or the extent of that event). Even without a drying event, the reduction in flows 
affects the total wetted area, water depth, sediment transport, and structure of the aquatic habitats 
(pools, runs, riffles). Reduced water quality may also be a concern, particularly as there would be 
less water for dilution of waste water treatment plant (WWTP) inflows. Primary constituent 
elements of designated critical habitat are also adversely affected. 
Id. at 33; see also id. at 33-41 (describing in detail the impacts, which the conclusion dismissed as “minimal”). 
165 In general, the services asked whether the particular project’s effects would be discernible at some 
regional scale.  But they rarely considered whether the project, in combination with other similar projects, would 
have a discernible effect.  See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL 
OPINION: BOERSMA GRAVEL PIT STABILIZATION, APPLEGATE RIVER 15 (2007) (finding no adverse modification for 
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within a few paragraphs of a cumulative effects analysis acknowledging that the species’ habitat 
was being degraded, and that the degradation was occurring through the incremental effects of 
small habitat alterations, but the apparent tension between their reasoning and the broader 
negative trend was never acknowledged.166 
The sets of biological opinions also contain a gap that indicates, perhaps more tellingly 
than anything affirmatively said, the limited actual reach of the adverse modification prohibition.  
Part II of this Article explained that the adverse modification prohibition would appear, on paper, 
to be the ESA’s primary mechanism for addressing federal actions increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions or accelerating the water quality impacts of urbanization.167  A person well-versed in 
statutory requirements but somewhat naïve about practical realities therefore might expect to see 
many biological opinions addressing new greenhouse gas sources and new urban 
development.168  But the former type of biological opinion does not appear in either data set.  
The latter type does, but far less frequently than one might expect.  The services consult when 
projects will abut, intrude into, or cross rivers or streams inhabited by listed species, but 
development projects not directly adjacent to waterways rarely are subjected to formal 
                                                                                                                                                       
a project with negative habitat impacts “it will only affect less than 1% of the Applegate River in the Lower 
Applegate River 5th Field watershed”);  U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NEW MEXICO ECOLOGICAL SERVICES 
FIELD OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: EFFECTS OF THE DRAIN UNIT 7 EXTENSION PRIORITY SITE PROJECT 20-21 
(2007) (finding no adverse modification for a project with adverse habitat impacts “because the impacts will be 
temporary and occur in a very small area relative to the overall critical habitat designation”). 
166 See, e.g., TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS GRAVEL MINING BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 164, at 16 
(finding no adverse modification for a gravel mining project just after noting that “[a]s the human population in the 
action area continues to grow, demand for agricultural, commercial, or residential development, as well as gravel for 
roads and concrete, is also likely to grow. The effects of new development caused by that demand are likely to 
reduce the conservation value of the habitat within the action area”); DRAIN UNIT 7 EXTENSION PRIORITY SITE 
BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 165, at 21 (finding no adverse modification for a habitat-degrading project within 
a few paragraphs of noting that other activities “will continue to threaten the survival and recovery of the silvery 
minnow by reducing the quantity and quality of habitat through continuation and expansion of habitat degrading 
actions”). 
167 See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text. 
168 Many development projects do not require federal funding or authorization and therefore would not be 
covered by section 7.  But many development projects do require federal wetlands permits, and federal funding also 
supports lots of road building, so the set of projects potentially subject to regulatory coverage still should be large. 
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consultation, notwithstanding their widely-understood impacts upon aquatic species’ habitat.169  
Two major classes of activities collectively causing major habitat degradation therefore proceed 
with essentially no ESA-based regulation at all.  
 B.  Project modifications 
While the jeopardy and adverse modification determinations might seem like the heart of 
the biological opinion, they are not the only important component.  Indeed, because of the rarity 
of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, the most important content probably lies 
elsewhere.  In particular, even when a biological opinion determines that a project is not likely to 
adversely modify critical habitat or cause jeopardy, the opinion still will often contain a list of 
modifications of and conditions for proceeding with the project.  I therefore also reviewed these 
modifying conditions, first to assess whether they seemed different when critical habitat was at 
issue, and second to assess what they revealed about the services’ approaches to habitat 
protection. 
  1.  The prevalence of take findings and conditions 
 As discussed in Part II, one might expect the critical habitat provisions to provide more 
habitat protection than the take provision.  The take provision applies only when an action 
proximately causes harm to protected animals.170  That seems to require a more complex 
showing of causation than would be necessary to demonstrate an adverse modification to critical 
habitat, for the latter showing would only require demonstration of harm to habitat.  But even as 
the services routinely decline to find adverse modification, they almost always predict that 
proposed projects will cause take of listed species, and they usually find that the take will be at 
                                                
169 The set of 138 closely-reviewed opinions included no consultations addressing the impacts of 
impervious cover at locations removed from the waterways, even though the cumulative impacts discussion in some 
of those opinions—particularly those for coho salmon—routinely identified urbanization as a threat.  See, e.g., 
TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS GRAVEL MINING BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 164, at 16.  
170 See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text (discussing the Sweet Home decision). 
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least partly due to habitat modifications.171  Of the subset of biological opinions I reviewed in 
detail, ninety-six percent anticipated take, and eighty-three percent anticipated take through 
habitat modification.172  Eighty-four percent of the opinions that anticipated negative aggregate 
effects on habitat found that habitat modifications would cause or contribute to takes.173  Even 
when the services anticipated a net benefit to species—and quite often they did, for many of the 
consultations involved restoration projects—take findings still were routine.174 
The services also almost always attempted to minimize the habitat degradation that led to 
take.  In almost every one of the opinions that anticipated take through habitat modification, the 
relevant service tried to limit that take by imposing “reasonable and prudent measures” at least 
partially designed to protect habitat.  They also imposed “conservation measures” to similar 
effect.175  In addition to these measures, the services would often include “conservation 
recommendations,” which are non-binding suggestions for additional actions that could benefit 
listed species.176  And while the biological opinions did not reveal these changes, biologists told 
me that the services routinely ask agencies to modify their project descriptions in ways designed 
to protect species.177 
The nature of those conditions varies.  For some species—typically salmonids178—the 
conditions are usually quite detailed, often running for several pages and containing highly 
specific instructions on everything from replanting native vegetation to staffing the project with 
                                                
171 See infra Table 3. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  The remaining seven opinions include one programmatic opinion, which left take findings to be 
made in subsequent project-specific biological opinions, and several opinions that did not clarify whether habitat 
modification was an anticipated cause of take. 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE TIFFANY SEDIMENT PLUG REMOVAL, supra note 
143, at 5. 
176 See, e.g., id. at 27. 
177 See, e.g., FWS biologist interview, December 21, 2010 (explaining that FWS’s “preference always is to 
get conservation up front.”). 
178 Salmonids include salmon and trout species.  Collectively they account for the majority of fish-related 
consultations. 
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trained biologists.179  For other species, the conditions are much more general.180  The conditions 
also varied in the extent to which they were tailored to specific sites.  Some were obviously 
created with one specific project in mind,181 but many reflected more generalized best 
management practices for the type of project and species at issue.  Some of those best 
management practices appeared to have informally evolved through a series of consultations on 
similar projects, while others were memorialized in programmatic consultations or in written 
interagency agreements.182   
Despite that variation, one common theme emerged: the services expected many of the 
conditions to provide significant benefits to the species.183  Sometimes the benefits would simply 
reduce the adverse impacts of the project, but with many projects the services anticipated that 
with the protective conditions in place, the project would actually benefit affected species.184  
While a rigorous evaluation of the accuracy of those predictions is impossible without 
monitoring data and some knowledge of the specific context of each project, and also is beyond 
the competence of a legal researcher, the claims easily pass a straight-face test.  Measures like 
replanting shade vegetation, re-engineering stream crossings to improve fish passage, isolating 
work areas, limiting work to seasons when listed fish species are less likely to be present, and 
                                                
179 See, e.g., NOAA’S NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: 
EAST/WEST FORK ILLINOIS RIVER BRIDGE REPLACEMENTS PROJECT 28-37 (2005) (nine pages specifying RPMs and 
implementing conditions). 
180 See, e.g., BUCKMAN DIVERSION BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 116, at 44-45 (specifying one RPM 
with one term and condition requiring the future development of a strategy to minimize project impacts). 
181 See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: 
MILLPORT SLOUGH BRIDGE SILETZ RIVER 36 (2009) (providing detailed specifications for eelgrass restoration to 
compensate for habitat impacted by the project). 
182 See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: SUCKER 
CREEK BRIDGE REPLACEMENT AND BANK STABILIZATION PROJECT 2 (2006) (describing conditions specified in an 
earlier programmatic biological opinion); NMFS biologist interview, November 16, 2010 (explaining that more than 
half of their consultations use standardized conditions, and describing this as a “very fruitful way to go” because of 
administrative efficiencies and because action agencies were willing to accept highly protective conditions). 
183 E.g. NMFS Biologist Interview, November 16, 2010 (describing some of the conditions as “pretty much 
bombproof”). 
184 See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NORTHWEST REGION, CONFERENCE OPINION: FALL 
CREEK CULVERT AND BRIDGE PROJECT (2005) (biological opinion for a roadway project coupled with substantial 
efforts to improve fish passage). 
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requiring trained fish biologists to observe project implementation185 all seem likely to provide 
real benefits to species.186 
2.  The slight (but evolving) importance of critical habitat 
The preceding discussion clearly demonstrates that section 7 consultations lead to habitat 
protection.  But I found little evidence that critical habitat designations make any difference in 
the level of protection. 
In reviewing biological opinions, I found no difference in approach for species with 
critical habitat and species without.  For both categories of species, the agencies allowed habitat-
degrading projects to proceed; for both categories, they imposed conditions designed to reduce, 
but not always eliminate, the extent of habitat impacts; for both categories, they used 
conservation requirements and reasonable and prudent measures to adjust projects; and within 
both categories the level of detail in the conditions varied.  But a limited quantitative analysis 
reveals no clear trends,187 and qualitatively, the variations seem more closely related to species 
type and office location than to the critical habitat designation.  Perhaps most tellingly, the 
biological opinions never mentioned protecting critical habitat as an independent justification for 
imposing conditions.  My analysis does not prove that the conditions imposed for species with 
critical habitat and those imposed for species without are the same, for there could be subtle 
distinctions that a primarily-qualitative comparison would not pick up.  But I found no 
affirmative documentary evidence that the agencies were using distinct approaches. 
The interviews nevertheless suggested that critical habitat designations have some 
effects.  Some, though not all, of the biologists believed that critical habitat designations slightly 
                                                
185 See, e.g., id. at 2-5, 23-30 (describing these and many other measures). 
186 The extent of the benefit is uncertain, however.  See Lyman L. McDonald et al., Monitoring and 
Evaluation: Salmon Restoration in the Columbia River Basin, in RETURN TO THE RIVER: RESTORING SALMON TO 
THE COLUMBIA RIVER 571, 588 (Richard N. Williams ed. 2006) (noting uncertainties about restoration activities) 
187 See Table 2, supra. 
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increased the likelihood that action agencies would engage in informal consultation prior to 
proceeding with projects.  Some, though again not all, of the biologists thought that the process 
of designating critical habitat spurred the services to think more carefully about species’ habitat 
needs, and that the resulting additional knowledge could help them develop more protective 
conditions.  Many of the biologists thought that a critical habitat designation gave the services 
more leverage to negotiate habitat conditions.188  With one exception,189 none of the biologists 
thought the changes were large, and any assertion of major across-the-board effects would be 
difficult to reconcile with the biological opinions.  But all thought that subtle effects do exist. 
 
                                                
188 E.g. E-mail from FWS biologist to author, November 24, 2010 (“The CH designation helped bring 
everyone to the table and gave me better leverage to negotiate some significant avoidance measures.”). 
189 See NMFS Biologist interview, November 22, 2010 (stating the designations gave her “a stronger arm 
going into negotiations… it makes a really big difference.”). 
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Table 3: Summary of agency biologist responses190 
 
Question Answers by the 
numbers 
Representative answers 
Do you think CH 
designations affect the 
frequency with which 
action agencies engage in 
informal consultations? 
Yes: 2 
Yes, slightly:  4 
Possibly: 2 
No: 7 
- A few biologists thought designations sensitize action agencies 
to effects on habitat, leading to more consultations 
- Several biologists perceived a change in the frequency of 
informal consultations for unoccupied habitat 
Do you think CH 
designations make 
projects more likely to 
proceed to formal 
consultation? 
Yes: 2 
Yes, slightly: 3 
Possibly: 2 
No: 8 
- Several biologists mentioned consultations for unoccupied 
habitat 
- One biologist who said “no” noted that she was starting to 
question that approach 
Do you think CH 
designations affect the 
choice of conservation 
measures? 
Yes: 5 
Maybe: 2 
Occasionally: 3 
No: 5 
- People are “more willing to negotiate and mitigate” 
-  “It makes a really big difference.” 
-  “Maybe, but not much” 
- “In any section 7 consultation, we strive to protect the species 
and the ecosystem it depends upon.” 
Do you think CH 
designations affect the 
choice of RPMs? 
Yes: 1 
Possibly,  or 
occasionally: 2 
No: 11 
- Many biologists asserted that RPMs should focus on mitigating 
take, not on independently protecting critical habitat 
- Two  biologists who said “no” thought that might change 
Do you think CH 
designations affect the 
choice of RPAs? 
Yes: 3 
It should: 1 
Maybe: 1 
No: 7 
No experience: 3 
- If an RPA came specifically out of an adverse modification 
determination, that would be a big deal 
Do you think CH 
designations increase the 
likelihood of jeopardy 
determinations? 
Yes: 4 
Maybe: 2 
Hard to say: 1 
No: 5 
No experience: 3 
- Some biologists thought designations increase focus on habitat, 
which could change the outcome of the jeopardy analysis; 
- Others argued that the jeopardy analysis was always focused on 
habitat and expected no change in outcomes 
 
Do you think CH 
designations affect 
outcomes in other ways? 
- They focus attention on particularly important areas 
- They help the services develop a better understanding of habitat needs 
- They cause actors “to take the ESA a little more seriously” 
- They create the inaccurate impression that non-designated areas are unimportant 
- “Critical habitat has proved to be useful in negotiating regional conservation 
strategies for section 10(a)(1)(B) permits” 
Have you seen a change 
over time in the ways in 
which CH designations 
affect implementation? 
- Yes; it’s an “evolving concept” 
- More internal scrutiny of adverse modification questions 
- Greater willingness to designate unoccupied habitat 
- Biologists are increasingly able to get project proponents to change projects; “it 
didn’t used to be that way.” 
- No, it’s still not that important in my region 
 
                                                
190 This table should be read with a few caveats in mind.  First, I did not ask for specific yes/no/I don’t 
know answers, and as a consequence the categories for the “by the numbers” column reflect the range of answers I 
received.  Second, representative comments that do not appear in quotes are paraphrased.  Third, one regional office 
provided me an email combining the responses of multiple biologists in several field offices, and I have treated that 
as a single response.  In short, this is a sampling of views, not a formal survey. 
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 C.  Adverse modification in the courts 
Consultation processes occasionally culminate in litigation, and the courts therefore help 
determine the effect of the adverse modification prohibition.  Judicial influence has been the 
focus of much of the previous legal literature on critical habitat,191 and from those analyses 
several hypotheses have emerged.  Some commentators have argued that critical habitat 
designations are essentially inconsequential for judicial review,192 while others have suggested 
that they add teeth to judicial review of no-jeopardy opinions.193  Interestingly, most legal 
commentators agree that judicial review of the adverse modification prohibition has little 
significance except to the extent it bolsters the jeopardy review.194  To test these hypotheses, and 
to assess what effect judicial review might be creating, I also reviewed the body of caselaw 
addressing adverse modification. 
The most striking quality of that body of caselaw is its small size.  Academic and popular 
descriptions sometimes portray the consultation process as hopelessly embroiled in litigation,195 
a characterization that tracks a broader view of the ESA.196  For decisions to list species and to 
designate critical habitat, that characterization has ample factual basis.197  But for the entire 
                                                
191 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 24, at 311 (“the ESA's prohibitions against jeopardy and habitat 
degradation are enforced solely through citizen actions in the courts”). 
192 See, e.g., Robert J. Scarpello, Note: Statutory Redundancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the 
Endangered Species Act to Exclude Critical Habitat Designation, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399, 413 (2003). 
193 Salzman, supra note 25, at 323, 324-27; Houck, supra note 24, at 310 (“the ESA's prohibition on 
modification of critical habitat is interpreted by courts as strong and unyielding; the prohibition on jeopardy is 
viewed as discretionary and flexible. Moreover, the absence of designated critical habitat makes a case based on 
jeopardy highly problematical—if not insurmountable.”); Josh Thompson, Comment: Critical Habitat Under the 
Endangered Species Act: Designation, Re-Designation, and Regulatory Duplication, 58 ALA. L. REV. 885, 890 
(2007). 
194 Salzman, supra note 25, at 324-27; Scarpello, supra note 192, at 413 (“there does not appear to be any 
case where a court found “adverse modification” of a critical habitat without also finding “jeopardy” to a listed 
species”). 
195 See, e.g., Jamison Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 417, 443 
(2005) (asserting that consultation occurs in the shadow of “the inevitable court challenge”). 
196 See, e.g., David J. Hayes, A Lack of Leadership on all Sides, 21 ENVTL. F. 46, 46 (2004) (lamenting 
“litigators—rather than dealmakers—dominating the ESA landscape of late.”). 
197 See, e.g., Testimony of Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Before the House Committee on Resources, Regarding H.R. 3824, The Threatened 
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thirty-eight year history of the ESA, Lexis and Westlaw combined contain only twenty decisions 
invoking the adverse modification prohibition to challenge federal agency actions.198  Not every 
litigated matter produces a judicial decision, and not all judicial decisions are published on Lexis 
or Westlaw.  But with the 2005-2009 period producing over 4,000 biological opinions just for 
fish species, twenty judicial opinions for all species over the entire life of the statute seems a 
rather small number.199  The overwhelming majority of adverse modification decisions are not 
litigated, and the extent of judicial oversight over most consultation processes is surprisingly 
minimal. 
The few decisions that do exist call into question the prior hypotheses about judicial 
review of adverse modification decisions.  First, several commentators, observing that no court 
had ever set aside a no-adverse-modification determination without also setting aside a no-
jeopardy determination, asserted that the adverse modification inquiry had assumed no 
independent significance for judicial review.200  Those observations were generally accurate 
when written, but more recent cases undermine the claim.  Courts have set aside no-adverse-
                                                                                                                                                       
and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, September 21, 2005 (describing the numbers of listing and 
designation cases). 
198 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
607 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2010); Ctr. For Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2010); Miccosukee 
Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009); Nat’l Wildlife Federation v. Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 
1059 (9th Cir. 2004); American Rivers v. NMFS, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860 (9th Cir. 1999); National Wildlife 
Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976); Forest Serv. Emps. v. United States Forest Serv., 726 F. Supp. 
2d 1195 (D. Mont. 2010); S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1247 
(E.D. Cal. 2010); Rock Creek Alliance v. Bradford, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43880 (D. Mont. 2010); Pacific Coast 
Federation of Fishermen's Associations v. Gutierrez, 606 F.Supp.2d 1122 (E.D.Cal. 2008); Nez Perce Tribe v. 
NMFS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28107 (D. Id. 2008); NRDC v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Ca. 2007); 
Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Lohn, 485 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Or. 2007); Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. BLM, 
422 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2006); NRDC v. Rodgers, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2005); National 
Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 235 F.Supp.2d 1143 (W.D.Wash., 2002); Idaho Rivers 
United v. NMFS, 1995 WL 877502 (W.D. Wash. 1995). I have also included Preserve Our Island v. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2009 WL 2511953 (W.D.Wash. 2009), a case in which the plaintiffs successfully challenged a 
determination that consultation was unnecessary, in this group. 
199 For older data on numbers of consultations, see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBERS OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 30 (1992). 
200 See supra note 192. 
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modification determinations, finding both errors of law and conclusions unsupported by factual 
evidence, without also setting aside no-jeopardy determinations.201  Even when courts have 
rejected both no-adverse-modification and no-jeopardy determinations, or have upheld both, they 
have often—though not always—analyzed the two issues independently.202  And, interestingly, 
plaintiffs have done rather well, winning fifteen of the twenty adverse modification cases.  The 
overall body of cases remains too small to support definitive conclusions about judicial 
approaches, but at the very least, the cases indicate that courts usually ascribe independent 
procedural and substantive significance to the ESA’s adverse modification requirements. 
Second, the judicial decisions provide little support for the assertion that critical habitat 
designations add stringency to judicial review of no-jeopardy determinations.  The authors who 
developed this hypothesis did so by evaluating a few early consultation cases.203  They found that 
in cases involving designated critical habitat, no-jeopardy determinations were set aside, while in 
some others not involving critical habitat, those no-jeopardy determinations were upheld.  
Initially, those older cases provide thin support for the conclusion.  In most of the cases where 
jeopardy determinations were set aside, the factual circumstances were remarkable, with 
agencies proposing actions that posed extraordinary threats to listed species’ survival.204  
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the seminal snail darter case, is a good example; the proposed 
dam was expected to obliterate the species, and the jeopardy prohibition clearly prohibits such an 
                                                
201 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting the regulatory definition of adverse modification); Nez Perce Tribe v. NMFS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28107 (D. Id. 2008); National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 235 F.Supp.2d 1143, 1159-
61 (W.D.Wash. 2002); Idaho Rivers United v. NMFS, 1995 WL 877502, *4-*8 (W.D. Wash. 1995). 
202 E.g. Nat’l Wildlife Federation v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 929-31 (jeopardy), 933-36 
(adverse modification); but see American Rivers v. NMFS, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860, *4-*9 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the adverse modification analysis was appropriately subsumed within the jeopardy analysis). 
203 See Salzman, supra note 25, at 324-27; Houck, supra note 24, at 307-09. 
204 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 171; Coleman, 529 F.2d at 362-68 (describing FWS’s repeated efforts to 
assert that the proposed project posed a major threat to a listed species). 
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action even absent a critical habitat designation.205  Those compelling fact patterns, rather than 
some subliminal effect of a critical habitat designation, provide a simpler explanation for the 
results.206  Moreover, at least in the set of decisions available on Lexis or Westlaw, no court has 
ever actually stated that a critical habitat designation changed the outcome of its jeopardy 
analysis.207  If the designations did so matter, one would expect a court to say so. 
The cases therefore demonstrate that critical habitat can hold independent significance for 
judicial review, and does not just stiffen the jeopardy review.  But the courts hold mixed views 
on how much critical habitat matters, particularly when incremental habitat degradation is at 
issue.  In several decisions, courts have questioned the services’ willingness to allow incremental 
habitat degradation, often criticizing the agencies’ failure to acknowledge the relationship 
between incremental degradation and cumulative harm.208  But in several other decisions, courts 
have allowed no-adverse-modification determinations to stand even where the projects were 
expected to degrade habitat.209   
                                                
205 437 U.S. 153, 171 (1978) (“We begin with the premise that operation of the Tellico Dam will either 
eradicate the known population of snail darters or destroy their critical habitat.”). 
206 One can also readily find cases in which jeopardy findings were set aside without any discussion of 
critical habitat.  See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed. of Fisherman’s Assoc. v. NMFS, 265 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2001). 
207 The closest case is Froehlke, in which the court stated: “It is significant that the Secretary of the Interior 
has the power… designate a critical habitat for an endangered species immediately… No such power has been 
invoked with regard to the Indiana bat and the Meramec Lake Park Project.”  534 F.2d at 1301 n.37.  But earlier in 
the same footnote, the court remarked that “even if these caves were presently designated ‘critical habitat,’ we could 
not say that trial court determination, namely that s 7 is not being violated, is clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
208 See Nat’l Wildlife Federation v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008); Oregon 
Natural Desert Ass’n v. Lohn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1198-1202 (D.Or. 2007); Nez Perce Tribe v. NMFS, 2008 WL 
938430, *10 (D.Idaho 2008) (“This wide-spread degradation of habitat means, according to NOAA, that ‘each 
additional increment of habitat loss’ could result in an exponential increase in the extinction risk…. Given these 
findings, the Court cannot conclude that the action area is too small to matter.). 
209 Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 607 F.3d 570, 578-79 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S., 566 F.3d 1257, 1269-1271, (11th  Cir. 2009) (upholding a biological 
opinion for a project that undisputedly would cause short-term harm to species habitat); Rock Creek Alliance v. U.S. 
Forest Service, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 1872864. *40-*41 (D.Mont. 2010) (upholding a no-adverse-
modification determination despite uncontested evidence that critical habitat would be slightly degraded). 
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No case better illustrates this latter approach than the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Butte Environmental Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.210  There, the court considered a 
challenge to a proposed development project that would allow the filling of wetlands designated 
as critical habitat.211  A significant area surrounding the wetlands also was designated as critical 
habitat, and the project would impact that area is well.212  In total, according to FWS, “the 
proposed development would destroy 234.5 acres of… critical habitat” of two endangered 
animal species.213  A listed plant species also was present, and 242.2 acres of its habitat “would 
be destroyed.”214  The court emphasized that these areas represented less than one percent of the 
total designated critical habitat of each species, but, as it also acknowledged, “the proposed 
project would contribute to a local and range-wide trend of habitat loss and degradation.”215   
The FWS nevertheless issued no-adverse-modification and no-jeopardy determinations, and the 
lawsuit ensued.  As the Ninth Circuit’s opinion makes clear, no question existed that the project 
would destroy hundreds of acres of critical habitat, and no one could dispute that the ESA 
expressly forbids federal agencies from approving actions likely to “destroy or adversely 
modify” critical habitat.216  But the court allowed the action to proceed.217  “The FWS's 
determination” the court concluded, “that critical habitat would be destroyed was thus not 
inconsistent with its finding of no ‘adverse modification.’ After all, the project would affect only 
a very small percentage of the total critical habitat.”218 
  D.  Summarizing critical habitat’s role 
                                                
210 607 F.3d 570. 
211 Id. at 578-79. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 578.  The project proponent planned to offset a small percentage of these impacts through 
restoration or protection of similar habitat elsewhere.  Id. at 579. 
214 Id. at 579. 
215 Id. (quoting FWS’s biological opinion). 
216 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
217 607 F.3d at 583. 
218 Id. 
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The foregoing discussion suggests that critical habitat designations have little effect upon 
consultation processes and only modest effects upon judicial review.  The effects are not non-
existent; the adverse modification prohibition has affected the outcome of several cases, even if a 
gap exists between the requirements articulated by the statute and those enforced by the courts.  
Agency biologists involved in consultation processes thought that critical habitat designations 
affect negotiations between the services and action agencies.  But the effects of critical habitat 
designations upon the regulators and upon judicial review still have been minor. 
That does not mean that critical habitat is unimportant.  Even if designations result in 
little additional regulatory constraint, they send signals to action agencies and to private entities.  
Unlike the listing of a species, which signals the possibility of ESA-related regulatory constraints 
only if one knows where the species is likely to live, lines on a map are easy to understand, and 
designations therefore can help landowners and action agencies avoid conflict with species 
needs.219  Even if critical habitat does not substantially change the services’ regulatory 
approaches, regulated entities seem to believe that designations do increase regulatory 
stringency, and that belief may also deter some activities that might otherwise harm species.220  
And designations may affect the regulatory approaches of other environmental agencies by 
providing a signal that some habitats are particularly important.221  The signals are not uniformly 
beneficial to species.  The agencies have complained that when designations are finalized, non-
designated habitat actually becomes harder to protect,222 and one study has suggested that 
                                                
219 See FWS biologist interview, January 26, 2011 (observing that action agencies will sometimes try to 
avoid projects in critical habitat areas).  They also can inflame conflict.  See Salzman, supra note 25, at 336 (quoting 
a former FWS official: “As soon as you draw a line on the map, they see it as the first step toward the feds 
condemning the land.”). 
220 See supra Table 3. 
221 See, e.g., California State Water Resources Control Board, Order No. WR 2000-13 (October 19, 2000), 
at 60-62 (referring to a critical habitat designation when determining the appropriate extent of fish protection). 
222 FWS biologist telephone interview, December 7, 2010.  
46 
 
proposed designations can spur preemptive conversion of habitat.223  The extent of these effects 
also is far from certain and is a worthy subject for additional research.  But most of the biologists 
I interviewed agreed that providing a warning about the presence of listed species does promote 
those species’ protection.   
In addition, the process of designating critical habitat can provide information that helps 
the services implement other statutory requirements.  That process currently includes an effort to 
identify some of the species’ key habitat needs.224  While some of that information already may 
be available to agency staff—the agencies routinely consider habitat threats in listing decisions 
and jeopardy analyses—several biologists told me that the critical habitat designation process 
leads to a more thorough and rigorous analysis of habitat needs.225  The resulting information 
then can help the agencies as they engage in consultations, develop recovery plans, negotiate 
habitat conservation plans, and target spending to conservation and recovery projects.226 
In short, critical habitat does matter.  But critical habitat has not yet mattered in quite the 
ways or to quite the extent that the statutory language would lead one to expect.  That could 
change, of course, and several biologists thought that regulatory protection of critical habitat 
would evolve.  But to date, any perception of substantially increased regulatory protection for 
species, or of heightened regulatory burdens for regulated entities, is mostly a mirage. 
 
V.  HABITAT PROTECTION AND THE NARRATIVES OF THE ESA 
                                                
223 See John A. List, Michael Margolis & Daniel E. Osgood, Is the Endangered Species Act Endangering 
Species? 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12777, 2006), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w12777. 
224 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Polar 
Bear (Ursus maritimus) in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg. 76086, 76115 (Dec. 7, 2010) (identifying the “primary 
constituent elements” of polar bear habitat). 
225 E.g. FWS Biologist telephone interview, November 4, 2010. 
226 Id. 
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So far, this Article may read like an attempt to document a scandal.  A core axiom of our 
administrative law system—indeed, our legal system—is that agencies should implement the law 
as it is written.227  Administrative policy disagreements with legal requirements are no basis for 
non-implementation, at least in the view of most scholars and judges,228 for we are, we tell 
ourselves, a nation run by “a government of laws, not of men.”229  With critical habitat, that 
faithful implementation has not happened.  The services have provided substitute protections, but 
to many commentators, the mitigation measures and conditions will seem rather unimpressive—
the sops thrown out by an administrative law system “geared,” as one scholar recently put it, 
“almost entirely to the legalization of natural resource damage.”230  Other readers may be 
tempted to draw a rather different conclusion.  They may see the agencies’ efforts as attempts—
partial and perhaps futile—to inject some restraint into a crazy law that, if faithfully 
implemented, would impose remarkably rigid constraints across much of the American 
landscape.231 
These conclusions would lead in almost entirely opposite directions, except for one 
shared conviction: in both narratives, the existing system of endangered species protection is 
deeply flawed and requires fundamental reforms.  Yet this Part argues that both narratives are at 
best incomplete.  There are significant problems with existing regulatory approaches, and Part VI 
explains how those problems might be addressed.  But there is also much to commend in those 
existing approaches.  This section therefore explains why, despite what may initially seem like 
                                                
227 See David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Law, 34 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). 
228 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“All the policy reasons in the world 
cannot justify reading a substantive provision out of a statute.”).  For a contrary view, see Antonin Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983) 
(“The ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of social change.”). 
229 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
230 Wood, supra note 48, at 55. 
231 See generally CHARLES C. MANN AND MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995). 
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empirical evidence of agency malfeasance, this study provides little support for some of the 
prevalent cynicism about ESA implementation and, more generally, about environmental and 
administrative law, and why the reforms I propose involve selective tinkering rather than a 
comprehensive overhaul.  
 A.  The persistence of flexibility 
At a press conference in 2008, then-Secretary of Interior Dirk Kempthorne referred to the 
Endangered Species Act as “perhaps the least flexible law Congress has ever enacted.”232  This 
was not a new claim.  For years, the ESA’s many political and academic critics have argued that 
it creates an unreasonably rigid regulatory scheme.233  Many critics contrast that flawed rigidity 
with administrative reforms or alternative regulatory approaches designed to introduce more 
creativity, negotiation, flexibility, and decentralization to the regulatory process.234  All of those 
critiques track some of the broader narratives of environmental law.   Both political and 
academic critics often assert that traditional regulatory approaches are too top-down, rigid, and 
insensitive to local conditions, that they are ultimately antithetical to the sort of innovation an 
effective legal regime should promote, and that they should be dramatically reformed.235 
                                                
232 Remarks by Secretary Kempthorne, Press Conference on Polar Bear Listing (May 14, 2008), at 
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2008/polarbear012308/pdf/press-conference-remarks.pdf. 
233 See, e.g., MANN AND PLUMMER, supra note 231, at 212-24 (characterizing the statute as fatally flawed 
because of its inflexibility); William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for Private 
Land Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3-4 (2004) (criticizing the statute as a case study in “command and 
control” regulation); M. Reed Hopper, Too Much Power for Too Little Results, 21 ENVTL. F. 47, 47 (2004) (“First, 
under the act the federal government asserts virtually absolute power over land and water use.  Second, the act does 
not balance the cost of species protection with the impacts on humans.”); Andrew P. Morriss and Richard L. Stroup, 
Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. 
L. 769, 785-86, 788-90 (2001) (“the ESA was designed around a command-and-control model.”). 
234 E.g., MANN AND PLUMMER, supra note 231, at 219 (arguing for different approaches in different 
regions), 224-33 (arguing that the ESA’s regulatory provisions should not automatically be invoked following a 
listing and that a habitat purchases should be emphasized as an alternative to regulatory prohibitions); Pedersen, 
supra note 233, at 3-4.  Thompson, supra note 30, at 321 (“Virtually all interested parties agree that the ESA can be 
significantly improved, despite their vocal disagreement as to how this should be achieved.”). 
235 See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New 
Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (asserting that the United States is “burdened with 
obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies”); Stewart, supra note 39, at 203, 213.  
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The claim that the ESA is rigidly implemented is impossible to reconcile with the 
agencies’ actual track record.  Every study to consider the section 7 process has found that 
jeopardy and adverse modifications are rare, and that even when the services do find jeopardy or 
adverse modification, projects still generally proceed.236  My study confirms those prior results, 
and adds two additional findings.  First, even when projects are clearly expected to degrade 
critical habitat and to take listed species, jeopardy and adverse modification determinations are 
still very infrequent.237  Moreover, that rarity has persisted despite a series of cases successfully 
challenging regulations authorizing permissive approaches.238  Second, for some classes of 
actions with major habitat impacts, formal consultation happens hardly at all.239 
The ESA does still impose procedural and substantive constraints on many individual 
projects, but the nature of those constraints undermines some of the classic critiques of the ESA.  
Those conventional critiques often assert that the ESA, and federal environmental law generally, 
are insensitive to local conditions.240  But actual biological opinions reveal that both FWS and 
NMFS usually try to craft location-specific protective measures.241  Rather than evolving through 
the top-down edicts of insulated bureaucrats in Washington, those measures originate at regional 
or field offices, usually through ongoing negotiations with regulated entities.242  More 
                                                
236 See supra note 148. 
237 See infra Table 2. 
238 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text. 
240 E.g. Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (2007) (“the Act adopts the clumsy and inefficient centralized command-and-control 
mechanism.”); Herman et al., supra note 235, at 3 (criticizing federal environmental law’s allegedly heavy reliance 
“on top-down, hierarchical regulatory approaches” and arguing that states can be “more nimble” in developing 
localized responses). 
241 See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text. 
242 See supra Table 3; Amy Sinden, The Importance of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1494 (“Ultimately, the ESA’s absolute standards involve a negotiation 
between environmental and economic interests...”). 
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generalized standards do evolve,243 but again the process is often bottom-up and negotiation-
driven, with field or regional office biologists working with frequently regulated agencies to 
develop standards for particular classes of projects.244 
This process is not cost-free, of course.245  Consultation takes time, and project conditions 
require money to implement.  But the scheme is implemented in cost-sensitive ways.  First, the 
constant use of negotiations provides opportunities to identify mitigation measures with 
relatively low financial cost and relatively high environmental returns.  Second, the selective but 
frequent use of generic standards suggests that action agencies and the services are sensitive to 
the tradeoff between more broadly-applicable standards, which can provide greater predictability 
for project designers and can expedite the consultation process, and site specific conditions, 
which can provide more carefully tailored protection, and are attempting to manage that tradeoff 
in a manner that balances cost-reduction and environmental protection.246   
The process also offers some opportunities for learning, adaptation, and regulatory 
evolution.  Because the services repeatedly interact with the same agencies,247 and because they 
routinely require monitoring of the implementation of their projects and of direct takes of 
species, they have created mechanisms for feedback.248  These mechanisms are far from perfect.  
Biological opinions rarely require contributions to species population or distribution monitoring, 
                                                
243 See NMFS Biologist Interview, Nov. 16, 2010 (explaining that the services increasingly rely on 
standardized conditions, partly because they lower administrative costs and partly because action agencies are 
willing to accept more protective conditions as a tradeoff for regulatory certainty). 
244 See NMFS Biologist Interview, November 16, 2010. 
245 See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE FEDERAL MANAGEMENT 
ATTENTION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 4-5, 54-56 (2004) (describing substantially 
increased permitting costs that applicants attributed to species listings). 
246 See NMFS Biologist Interview, November 16, 2010 (describing standardized conditions as an important 
way to expedite consultations and reduce administrative costs). 
247 A few agencies—the Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Forest Service, and Bureau of 
Land Management—account for the vast majority of the consultations I reviewed. 
248 Almost every opinion I reviewed required some form of monitoring.  Usually the action agency was 
required to monitor direct take of the species and to monitor and document its implementation of conservation 
measures and RPMs.  See also CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 9-1 to 9-2 (describing monitoring 
requirements). 
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even though such monitoring which might provide important data for developing broader 
conservation and protection strategies.249  The agencies also never have followed through on a 
proposal laid out in their consultation handbook, which calls for the creation of a centralized 
database of monitoring results.250  Agency biologists told me that the actual extent of compliance 
monitoring is uneven.251  But the agencies are gathering some data and are creating some 
opportunities for dialogue and learning, and that is an important start.  Agency staff thought that 
dialogue and learning was paying dividends; in interviews, several biologists explained ways that 
their approaches to mitigation were evolving and improving over time.252 
In short, ESA implementation already involves many of the approaches that would-be 
reformers suggest are necessary to an effective regulatory scheme, and it involves those elements 
despite the persistence of an old-style regulatory structure.  To someone who argues that the 
ESA’s basic goals are not worthwhile, that may be small consolation, but many of the critiques 
of the ESA focus on means rather than ends, and the means are more sensible than many of the 
critics acknowledge.253  There is enough room for creativity and flexibility within existing 
approaches to accommodate many of the flexibility-oriented reformers’ stated goals. 
B.  The absence of capture254 
                                                
249 On the importance of such monitoring, see Eric Biber, Environmental Law’s Monitoring Problem 
(forthcoming __). 
250 See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 9-2 to 9-6 (describing this program).  I found no 
evidence of its existence. 
251 E.g. FWS Biologist Interview, November 17, 2010 (stating that the services have little capacity to do 
follow-up work). 
252 NMFS Biologist Interview, November 16, 2010 (describing the evolution of negotiated standardized 
conditions); NMFS Biologist Interview, November 22, 2010 (describing increased interest in off-site mitigation). 
253 Many critiques of the ESA argue that the core problem with the act is not that its goals are not 
worthwhile but instead that its means create perverse incentives.  See, e.g., Angela Logomasini and Robert J. Smith, 
Protect Endangered Species, in FROM LIBERATE TO STIMULATE: A BIPARTISAN AGENDA TO RESTORE LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT AND REVIVE AMERICA'S ECONOMY 62, 62 (Ivan Osorio and Wayne Crews eds. 2011) (“The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 is bad for wildlife, because it is bad for people.”). 
254 A “captured” agency has become controlled by the entities it is supposed to be regulating.  See Thomas 
W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts, 1967-83, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997). 
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This Article is by no means the first to challenge the common view that the ESA is a 
rigidly-implemented statute, or that environmental law generally is inflexibly implemented by 
bureaucratic zealots.  For decades, some commentators have argued that the ESA actually is 
quite pliable—excessively so, some say—in practice.255  Perhaps the most eloquent advocate of 
this view is Oliver Houck, who once argued that “[a] handful of piers for powerboats in 
designated critical habitat areas aside, there is no evidence that formal consultation under the 
Endangered Species Act is stopping the world.  Indeed, there is little evidence that it is changing 
it very much at all.”256  In Houck’s widely-shared view, the implementing agencies have 
responded to intense political pressure by reading rigid mandates out of the statute and 
interpreting it as largely discretionary.257  They then have invoked that discretion to avoid 
imposing meaningful regulatory control.258  Some of these critics are more sanguine about the 
ESA’s protective force, but they still argue that it protects listed species only because the facial 
rigidity of its mandates means that even a watered-down version of the ESA still holds 
substantial force.259   In short, while the unsympathetic critics view the ESA as the poster child 
                                                
255 See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 242, at 1491-1510; Houck, supra note 24, at 279; Ray Vaughan, State of 
Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and the Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart 
Protection of Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569, 596-97 (1995) (“virtually all of the work of the FWS under the 
ESA seems to favor industry”). 
The ESA literature also contains many views between these poles.  E.g. STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, 
PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982) (observing that facially 
prohibitive policies are actually implemented with flexibility); J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Spcies Act Eco-
Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (arguing that the ESA is sometimes a “pit bull” but also “has 
accommodated well-planned land development around the nation with a measure of flexibility not characteristic of 
many other environmental laws”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-22 
(1997). 
256 Houck, supra note 24, at 321. 
257 Id. at 279 (“[T]he Departments of Interior and Commerce … have converted an act of specific stages 
and clear commands into an act of discretion.”); see Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, The Endangered 
Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 62 
(2001) (describing “[t]he tendency to use discretion to reduce the protection of biological resources under political 
pressure”). 
258 See id. ([T]he ESA has accommodated the overwhelming majority of human activity without 
impediment.”); Vaughan, supra note 255, at 596-97. 
259 See Sinden, supra note 242, at 1498. 
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for regulatory rigidity run amok, many sympathetic critics view it as a classic study in regulatory 
accommodation and capture. 
The evidence that this dynamic sometimes exists is overwhelming,260 and this study 
provides some new support for this view.  Most importantly, a central conclusion of this study is 
that the adverse modification prohibition has barely been implemented, and that the services 
have eschewed faithful application of the statute in favor of a more discretionary approach that 
often allows projects to degrade designated critical habitat.261  The capture-and-accommodation 
hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for that choice.  Similarly, both individual biological 
opinions and individual court cases demonstrate that the agencies sometimes adopt strained 
reasoning in support of no-adverse-modification decisions, sometimes in response to 
acknowledged political pressure.262  That strained reasoning suggests a vigorous effort to avoid 
imposing regulatory constraints.  Though these machinations may sometimes seem remarkable, 
the motivation behind them is not hard to understand.  No one could credibly dispute that the 
political pressures against species protection are persistent and intense. 
But much of the evidence produced by this study does not comport with assertions that 
the services are captured agencies.  Most importantly, that evidence indicates that the services 
are using the ESA to change thousands of proposed projects.  Even as they have allowed the 
critical habitat protections to languish, they have consistently been finding that proposed projects 
will “take” species and have been imposing “reasonable and prudent measures,” many of which 
                                                
260 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1601, 1603-1609 (2008) (describing several recent controversies). 
261 See supra part IV. 
262 See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers, 381 
F.Supp.2d 1212, 1220 (E.D.Cal., 2005) (quoting agency emails about a politically-driven no-jeopardy opinion); 
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089 (W.D. Wash.), aff’d, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(documenting heavy political pressure to adopt marginally protective approaches).. 
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appear extensive and meaningful, upon almost all of the projects they review.263  Though those 
“reasonable and prudent measures” are sometimes minimal or hortatory, the services have 
multiple other ways, all frequently used, to minimizing projects’ adverse effects, and often to 
change projects so that they provide net benefits for species’ habitat.264  Compared to a baseline 
of complete ESA implementation, the results may seem disappointing, but they still represent 
much more environmental protection than the services would ever accomplish if they really were 
acting only in response to litigation—which, as discussed above, is relatively rare. 
The time involved in consultation processes also provides an indication that the agencies 
are not pushover regulators.  Though biologists told me ways they had tried to expedite the 
consultation process, none suggested that they were doing so at the expense of species 
protection, and particularly for complex projects, the consultation process can last months or 
even years.265  Nor did any of the biologists I spoke with fit the model of a captured bureaucrat.  
Instead, I heard consistent commitment to the underlying statutory goal of species protection, 
and consistent description of the ways biologists tried to fulfill that commitment.  The biologists 
believe, as one put it, that under section 7 they “have a lot of flexibility to do things that are good 
for species,”266 and that they are actively putting that flexibility to use.  They were aware, of 
course, of the political controversies associated with the ESA, and some acknowledged ways in 
which those pressures affected their work.267  Some also expressed frustration with what they 
perceived as a failure to develop the concept of adverse modification or to use it to its full 
                                                
263 See supra Table 2. 
264 This finding also contravenes the commonly-asserted view that the agencies rarely regulate under 
section 9.  See, e.g., Vaughan, supra note 255 at 597 (“the prohibitions against takings in section 9 are not enforced 
with anything resembling vigor”); Thompson, supra note 30, at 315. 
265 See GAO, supra note 148, at 3-5. 
266 FWS biologist telephone interview, December 21, 2010. 
267 E.g. FWS biologists interview, November 3, 2010 (acknowledging that section 7 implementation is 
politically sensitive). 
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potential.268  They were similarly aware of the influence of litigation upon implementation; in 
fact, several mentioned that Gifford Pinchot Task Force and related cases had compelled (or 
empowered) the services to rethink their approach to critical habitat.269   But both interviews and 
documentary evidence demonstrate that a public choice-based theory of administrative 
governance, in which the services simply respond to the balance of power created by 
development interests’ lobbying and environmental groups’ lawsuits, misses a key part of the 
story.  Instead, a meaningful regulatory effort comes from within the agencies. 
The core point of this discussion is not that the existing approaches to habitat protection 
are wonderful and in no need of change.  A regulatory approach that diverges from statutory 
requirements obviously is problematic, particularly if the divergence threatens to undermine 
achievement of the basic statutory goal of removing species from the list.  That potential 
divergence is not just harmful to species; for potentially regulated entities, recovery means a 
respite from some of the regulatory stringency of the ESA, and therefore ought to bring 
significant economic benefits.  But even with those caveats, the services’ efforts support an 
unconventionally positive view of at least part270 of the existing regulatory scheme.  That 
regulatory scheme already has given those agencies useful tools to work with, and the agencies 
have used those tools in creative, pragmatic, and, often, effective ways.  With modest reforms—
                                                
268 E.g. FWS biologist interview, January 26, 2011 (explaining a common perception that biologists were 
“just documenting the demise until there’s nothing left… [we] probably need a higher-level discussion on doing 
these analyses”). 
269 See, e.g., NMFS biologist interview, November 22, 2010 (stating that Gifford Pinchot Task Force gave 
her more leverage to push for conditions that promoted recovery). 
270 I am not arguing that this moderately rosy view of administrative agency practice should extend to the 
processes of listing species or of designating critical habitat.  In both processes, little happens without litigation.  But 
a decision to include something—whether that something is a species, habitat area, or chemical—in a regulatory 
system may involve very different dynamics than decisions about how to go about regulating the thing once the 
obligation to regulate is clear.  The former type of decision often depends upon a push from litigation or legislation.  
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (responding to EPA’s reluctance to expand its regulatory 
program to encompass greenhouse gas emissions); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
542, 752-53 (8th ed. 2010) (describing EPA’s reluctance to list hazardous air and water pollutants); Owen, supra 
note 129, at __ (describing EPA’s reluctance to include stormwater sources in its regulatory program until 
compelled by litigation).  The latter sometimes does not.   
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none of them actually requiring legislative changes—providing more effective tools, the services 
could do even better. 
 
VI.  CRITICAL HABITAT AND THE CHALLENGES OF INCREMENTAL DEGRADATION 
The preceding discussion indicates that the services are using the ESA to provide 
substantial habitat protection.  Yet, paradoxically, a gap persists between the statutory mandate 
and actual agency practice.  This section considers why that gap exists, how reforms might 
address it, and what the gap and its potential fixes reveal about the challenges of regulating small 
environmental harms. 
 A.  The dilemma and the critical habitat response 
Any effort to regulate incremental environmental degradation must address a crucial 
question: when are harms too small to trigger regulation?271  Yet neither the ESA itself, which 
suggests a stringent and prohibitory regulatory system, nor the services, which have taken a more 
permissive course, have developed an effective response. 
This dilemma is difficult to resolve partly because each of the obvious answers is flawed.  
One possibility is to try to prohibit every contribution to the environmental problem, no matter 
how small.  But in practice, the administrative costs of such an approach could be extraordinary, 
the burdens imposed might outweigh any environmental gain, and both the regulators and the 
regulated would likely resist implementation.272  Alternatively, regulators might prohibit only 
those actions that cause major harm (or prohibit nothing at all).  But if the environmental 
problem is primarily caused by small actors, a regulatory approach focusing only on a few major 
                                                
271 See, e.g., Madeline June Kass, The NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into Account in 
Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47 (2009) (analyzing similar questions that arise in NEPA 
compliance). 
272 See id. at 71. 
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actors will solve little.273  Moreover, any system that distinguishes between regulated “large” 
contributors and unregulated “small” ones faces a line-drawing problem.  Environmental harms 
often exist on a continuum of scales, and if there is no clear distinction between small and large 
harms, any line will seem somewhat arbitrary.274  The distinction is even harder to draw if, as is 
often the case, no one knows how much harm each action will cause.275  
This problem has been the Achilles heel of critical habitat protection.  The statute itself 
suggests a very low regulatory threshold, under which the services would prohibit any federally-
approved worsening of critical habitat, no matter how minor.276  But without some creative 
additional measures, such an approach cannot work.  The services already are politically 
embattled and administratively swamped—“barely keeping our heads above water,” as one 
biologist put it—and it is difficult to imagine them performing individualized consultations on, 
let alone vetoing, many additional projects.277  Congress, which has preferred using its power of 
the purse to undercut ESA implementation, is unlikely to appropriate the funds necessary to 
support a larger workload.278  The political backlash against more extensive regulatory 
prohibitions also would almost certainly be intense.  Unsurprisingly, the services have not 
embraced this approach, and they have sometimes assured the world that they never will.279  
Instead, they have chosen to prohibit a few major habitat modifications, to allow more minor 
modifications to proceed subject to conditions, to let other modifications proceed without any 
                                                
273 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New 
Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 533-34 (2004). 
274 See generally Malcolm L. Hunter et al., Thresholds and the Mismatch Between Environmental Laws and 
Ecosystems, 23 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1053 (2009). 
275 See, e.g., supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility of linking 
greenhouse gas emissions from specific activities to specific increments of habitat change). 
276 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
277 FWS biologists interview, November 3, 2010. 
278 See Doremus, supra note 260, at 64 (describing Congressional efforts to hamstring ESA 
implementation).  
279 See INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC. AND NORTHERN ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at ES-6 (stating that FWS 
will not use the polar bear critical habitat designation as a basis for regulating climate change). 
58 
 
regulation at all, and to use a case-by-case approach to drawing the lines.  That approach has 
several positive features—in practice, it functions rather similarly to the sort of feasibility-based 
performance standards that air and water quality regulators have successfully relied upon280—
and it limits regulatory overreach, but it substitutes other problems.   
First, the services’ chosen approach necessitates distinguishing among levels of harm, 
and the services have struggled to define, let alone justify, the lines.  Their regulations and 
guidance use fuzzy terms that simply suggest that thresholds might exist.281  The services now 
disclaim reliance on even those vague regulations and have not put forth any sort of generalized 
standard in their place.282  Nor have the courts set forth any sort of standard.283  As a practical 
matter, individual field offices and individual courts have been left to find thresholds on an ad 
hoc basis.  Their choices have often been permissive, and their justifications sometimes seem 
premised on the dubious assumption that small harms pose no real threat to species.284 
The services’ chosen approach also may be insufficiently protective.  Recovering species 
is a core goal of the ESA, and for good reason; if a species recovers, the environmental goals of 
the statute are served and regulated entities should face reduced regulatory burdens, for they will 
no longer be subject to the ESA’s procedural and substantive constraints.  But if a species was 
listed primarily because of the threat of habitat degradation—and, with most species, that was a 
primary, if not the primary, threat285—then allowing additional habitat degradation is 
fundamentally inconsistent with that goal.  With some species, the harmful projects may not be 
creating an overall negative trend, for the services consistently impose protective conditions, 
                                                
280 See generally Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental 
Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 410-28 (1994) (explaining, and praising, feasibility-based standards); Wendy E. Wagner, 
The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (same). 
281 See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text. 
282 See Jones Memorandum, supra note 114; Hogarth Memorandum, supra note 115. 
283 See supra notes 201-218 and accompanying text.   
284 See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text. 
285 See Wilcove et al., supra note 52. 
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some sufficiently protective to avoid any negative habitat impact, and the public funds many 
restoration projects.286  But in the absence of a rigorous effort to relate individual consultation 
outcomes to broader species trends, it is very difficult to know if the services are doing 
enough.287  And even if their efforts are producing positive trends, they are doing so by shifting 
to a subset of regulated projects—and, to a large extent, to the taxpayer—the burden of 
compensating for the many projects that escape the adverse modification prohibition. 
If critical habitat protection is to assume greater significance, and if the gap between the 
services’ implementation approach and statutory requirements is to be reduced, if not closed, the 
services and the courts must resolve this regulatory thresholds dilemma.  They need not throw 
out everything about their existing approaches, for, as discussed above, they already are 
accomplishing quite a lot through their attempts to minimize each project’s impacts.  But they do 
need a few additional tools.  The discussion below explains two promising possibilities.288 
1.  Low thresholds and off-site mitigation 
While reviewing biological opinions, I found very few uses of off-site mitigation to 
compensate for on-site environmental impacts.289  If a project was going to degrade location A, 
the services generally imposed conditions to minimize (and sometimes eliminate) that 
                                                
286 See supra Table 2. 
287 See generally Rose, supra note 13, at 279 (“In focusing on individual actors' behavior, [behavior-based] 
measures were inattentive to the fact that even small amounts can add up.”). 
288 A third possibility, which merits more extensive discussion than this article has space to provide, would 
be to integrate the services’ efforts with other agencies’ initiatives to address major problems like climate change or 
urban sprawl.  Such integration might blunt common criticisms of the ESA, which sometimes suggest that the 
statute pits species protection against all other important social values.  See, e.g., MANN AND PLUMMER, supra note 
231, at 213 (“[I]t is not possible to (protect species) and simultaneously ensure that good housing is available to 
everyone.  Or good health care, for that matter, or a good education.”).  But while numerous scholars have 
emphasized the importance of such integration, the challenges of achieving it are substantial.  See, e.g., James E. 
Krier and Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119, 121-22 (1991) (explaining some of 
the practical considerations that led EPA to reject an integrated regulatory approach); Ruhl and Salzman, supra note 
10, at 70-71. 
289 In the pool of 138 biological opinions that I closely reviewed, only a handful called for or referred to 
off-site mitigation measures.  Those measures might have been prescribed in other documents—some biological 
opinions refer to conditions set forth in the action agency’s biological assessment—but the rarity of references to 
off-site mitigation demonstrates that it is not common practice. 
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degradation at location A, but they did not require compensatory restoration work at location B.  
Individual biologists did mention using this approach, but not extensively, and in their 
experience it was relatively new.290  In taking this approach, they were working with little 
direction or guidance.  The services’ joint consultation regulations say nothing about off-site 
mitigation, and their consultation handbook does not prescribe any such approach, let alone 
provide guidance for its implementation. 
This is a lukewarm embrace of a practice now standard in many other areas of 
environmental law.291  Off-site mitigation is now a core part of wetlands protection.292   Offset 
programs, under which new pollution sources in non-attainment areas must pay existing sources 
to reduce their emissions, are specifically prescribed by the Clean Air Act.293  Off-site mitigation 
is even common practice in “habitat conservation plans” prepared pursuant to ESA section 10.294  
In the view of many environmental scholars, these trading regimes are both economically and 
environmentally preferable to traditional regulatory approaches, and, according to some 
commentators, their emergence has been a crucially important step in the maturation of 
environmental law.295 
Despite their growing prevalence, these trading approaches have their detractors.  Critics 
have argued that in practice, off-site mitigation often has meant trading ecologically valuable 
natural systems for dysfunctional artificial substitutes.296 More broadly, critics argue that in 
                                                
290 E.g. NMFS Biologist Interview, November 22, 2010. 
291 See generally James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
292 See id. at 650-51. 
293 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (2006). 
294 See Salzman and Ruhl, supra note 291, at 648-49. 
295 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1333, 1334-40 (1985); Salzman and Ruhl, supra note 291, at 609-11 (citing some of the voluminous literature on 
this subject). 
296 See Fred Bosselman, Swamp Swaps: The “Second Nature” of Wetlands, 39 ENVTL. L. 577, 583 (2009) 
(summarizing critiques); COMMITTEE ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
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practice, trading schemes are excessively complex and often involve trading real environmental 
degradation for fictional environmental gains.297  And even though trading programs are 
designed to reduce opposition to environmental regulation, they rarely eliminate it.  Even with 
mitigation programs in place, regulated entities have still chafed at the extent of environmental 
regulation and have taken their frustrations as far as the Supreme Court, with some success.298 
The critics raise important points, but the critical habitat experience shows that in the 
absence of an offsite trading program, many small environmental harms will simply escape 
regulatory coverage.  If a project has significant non-environmental social utility—if, to use an 
example cited by one NMFS biologist, it is a small repair that will allow an important existing 
roadway to remain functional299—but will unavoidably harm a small habitat area, a biologist 
must choose between enforcing the letter of the statute at significant social (and, potentially, 
political) cost or, alternatively, allowing habitat degradation to proceed without mitigation.  It is 
not hard to imagine what most biologists will choose.  Yet those same impacts might be cheaply 
mitigated, perhaps by contributing to a dam removal, wetlands restoration project, or purchase of 
environmental water rights elsewhere on the same river, and the action agency and project 
proponent might be willing to support those efforts as a condition for proceeding with the 
project.  Designing such an off-site mitigation program is no easy task; the extensive critiques of 
existing programs amply demonstrate that mitigation trading programs require careful design and 
                                                                                                                                                       
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 1-10 (2001) (summarizing problems with 
then-prevalent mitigation approaches). 
297 These concerns have been particularly salient in the debate over climate change mitigation methods.  
See, e.g., Nick Davies, The Inconvenient Truth about the Carbon Offset Industry, THE GUARDIAN, June 16, 2007, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/16/climatechange.climatechange.  See also Salzman 
and Ruhl, supra note 291 (discussing some of the inherent challenges of creating trading systems). 
298 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) (describing, with obvious consternation at its 
scope, the federal regulatory program for wetlands). 
299 NMFS Biologist Interview, November 22, 2010. 
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oversight.300  But for critical habitat protection, even modestly effective mitigation efforts should 
improve upon the status quo. 
2.  Planning and standardized threshold-setting 
Another distinctive feature of the services’ current approach is its ad-hoc, project-by-
project selection of regulatory thresholds.  As of this writing, the services have no regulation or 
even guidance that defines the line between adverse modification and permissible habitat 
degradation.  Nor do they have any process, outside of individual consultations, for drawing that 
distinction.  Agency biologists do discuss the question; several biologists told me that these 
questions are often debated in what one described as “geeky section 7 coordinator circles.”301  
But none of the biologists felt that the services had resolved the issue, and opinions varied about 
what the standard should be.302  To add to the challenge, current agency regulations and guidance 
place partial blinders on biologists seeking to resolve this question.  When conducting 
consultations, the services may not consider the cumulative impacts of other future projects also 
subject to consultation.303 
That approach places field biologists in difficult positions.  To determine whether an 
individual project contributes significantly to a larger problem, a field biologist would need to 
understand the impacts of the full set of activities likely to affect the species.  For a biologist 
                                                
300 See, e.g., Salzman and Ruhl, supra note 291 (exploring the challenges of developing such programs). 
301 FWS Biologist Interview, December 21, 2010; see FWS Biologist Interview, January 12, 2011 (“section 
7 people talk about this endlessly”); but see FWS Biologist Interview, November 4, 2010 (contrasting discussions of 
jeopardy, which she felt had led to better understanding of the concept, with less-developed discussions of adverse 
modification). 
302 Compare FWS Biologist Interview, January 12, 2011 (asserting that Congress intended the jeopardy and 
adverse modification standards to be the same) with Email from NMFS Biologist, October 15, 2010 (“I believe the 
bar for an adverse mod/destruction determination is much lower than a jeopardy determination.”); FWS biologist 
interview, December 7, 2010 (asserting that “ad mod could be a much lighter trigger” and that it is “sort of 
problematic” that adverse modification and jeopardy are typically treated as equivalent). 
303 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-31 (excluding future federal actions and any other 
action that is not “reasonably certain to occur” from the analysis); see Rohlf, supra note 100, at 156-57 (criticizing 
this approach as “virtually unworkable”). 
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swamped with consultation deadlines and struggling to get through the day’s work,304 stepping 
back and performing that kind of broader analysis is likely to be impossible, particularly if 
agency guidance tells that biologist to ignore many future projects.305  In the absence of that 
broader perspective, and without the backing of a centralized policy on cumulative impacts, a 
decision to impose a prohibitive regulatory regime on a project with seemingly minor impacts 
will be very difficult to make.306  Occasionally agency biologists will be willing to do so, but it 
should be no surprise if often they are not. 
Again, other environmental laws offer better alternatives, with the most robust example 
coming from air quality planning.  Every year, air quality planners in non-attainment zones 
across the country confront a challenge like the habitat degradation problems faced the FWS and 
NMFS.307  Rarely is regional air quality determined by the emissions from a single facility.  
Instead, air pollution problems typically derive from the collective emissions of many factories, 
power plants, roads, and other sources.308  Those emissions often interact in complex and non-
linear ways.309  Consequently, determining on an ad-hoc, project-by-project basis what level of 
emissions should trigger regulation would be nearly impossible, and the Clean Air Act does not 
ask anyone to try.  It instead compels states to develop “state implementation plans” that address 
all emission sources, and it only allows approval of plans that simulation models predict will 
                                                
304 See FWS biologists interview, November 3, 2010 (stating that the services are “barely keeping our heads 
above water with section 7 consultations”). 
305 See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-31. 
306 See David M. Theobald et al., Ecological Support for Rural Land-Use Planning, 15 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 1906, 1909 (2005) (explaining the difficulty of finding changes to be significant when each proposed 
project will cause only a small change).  Agency biologists readily acknowledged that adverse modification findings 
were not encouraged.  See NMFS biologist interview, December 7, 2010 (“you write this, you’re going to have to 
defend it and support it and come up with an alternative”). 
307 Non-attainment zones are areas that do not comply with national ambient air quality standards.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 7501(2). 
308 See 42 U.S.C. 7408 (requiring ambient air quality standards for pollutants “the presence of which in the 
ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources”).   
309 See James D. Fine and Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and 
Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 914, 944-45 (2005) (describing 
mechanisms of ozone creation). 
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attain the ultimate air quality goal.310  The contrast to the project-by-project section 7 approach is 
dramatic. 
This comprehensive approach presents several obvious advantages.  First, rather than 
addressing each individual action in an analytical vacuum, it gives planners an opportunity to 
consider the aggregate consequence of all of the actions threatening to cause environmental 
degradation.  Second, it compels them to think through the implications of setting regulatory 
thresholds at a particular level.  If those thresholds are set too high, and the modeling is 
reasonably accurate,311 the model will not predict attainment, and the planners must return to the 
drawing board.312  Third, that approach gives regulators opportunities to develop programs to 
compensate if they do choose to set regulatory thresholds that exempt some contributors.313  If 
regulators decide that regulating some low-level emitters is not worth the effort, they can change 
the stringency of other regulatory programs to compensate for that selective non-coverage.  In 
short, rather than addressing each project’s incremental impacts in an analytical vacuum, that 
approach compels regulators to ask “how are we going to fit our approach to incremental harms 
into a larger strategy for achieving the outcome we want?”314 
                                                
310 42 U.S.C. 7410.  For detailed descriptions of this approach, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality 
Protection Using State Implementation Plans--Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
209, 226-41 (2004); Fine and Owen, supra note 309, at 949-62.  These SIPs are not the Clean Air Act’s exclusive 
regulatory program; it also relies extensively on technology-based controls. 
311 Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not.  See Fine and Owen, supra note 309, at 949-62 (describing an 
unsuccessful monitoring exercise); Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 
TULANE L. REV. 265, 282 n.93 (2009) (quoting EPA employees describing some of their models as very accurate). 
312 See Fine and Owen, supra note 309, at 914 (noting that the Clean Air Act requires attainment 
demonstrations as a prerequisite to SIP approval). 
313 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470 (2001) (“It is to the States that the CAA 
assigns initial and primary responsibility for deciding what emissions reductions will be required from which 
sources.”). 
314 Many critics allege that this type of comprehensive planning is prone to manipulation and requires more 
information than regulators realistically can obtain.  See, e.g., Reitze, supra note 310, at 357-58 (dismissing the SIP 
program as a “failure,” largely because many areas remain in nonattainment); OLIVER O. HOUCK, THE TMDL 
PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 207 (1999) (“[O]ne would not wish the SIP program on one’s 
worst enemy”).  Both problems are clearly real, and the track record of these planning approaches includes many 
failures.  See, e.g., Fine and Owen, supra note 309, at 956-957, 960-62 (discussing a planning process marked by 
misleading treatment of uncertainties and questionable tweaking of assumptions).  But it also includes successes, 
65 
 
Though the services may never develop an approach as intensive as the SIP process, 
planning processes already prescribed by other sections of the ESA provide useful starting 
points.  First, ESA section 4 already prescribes recovery plans for listed species.315  That 
recovery planning creates an opportunity to develop regulatory thresholds and to integrate those 
thresholds into a broader strategy for recovery.316  Second, and more ambitiously, the services 
could integrate critical habitat protection into large-scale “habitat conservation plans” (HCPs) 
prepared pursuant to sections 9 and 10 of the ESA.317  These plans allow otherwise prohibited 
“takes” of endangered species so long as the entity responsible for the take is participating in a 
plan expected to provide a net benefit to the impacted species.318  The services could offer the 
same deal for projects causing small adverse changes to habitat: if the project proponent 
participates in a broader HCP that will create an overall improvement in habitat conditions, the 
services would not find adverse modification.319  Though implementing such an approach would 
be challenging,320 the benefits might be substantial.321  A coordinated conservation approach 
could provide much more conservation benefit than many isolated and partial minimization 
                                                                                                                                                       
and some regulators believe their planning approaches have worked reasonably well.  See, e.g., Owen, supra note 
311, at 283 n.101 (noting that EPA employees involved in SIP planning viewed the process as reasonably 
successful) 
315 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2006).   
316 That shift would significantly change recovery planning, which critics allege has traditionally involved 
vague plans and modest goals.  See, e.g., Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking about 
the Endangered Species Act, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1996). 
317 See 16 U.S.C. C 1539(a)(2)(A) (2006);  
318 See Ruhl and Salzman, supra note 291, at 648-49 (explaining the program). 
319 To be legally tenable, that approach would need to treat participation in the HCP as part of the “action” 
subject to consultation.  I see nothing in the statute that precludes such an approach. 
320 HCPs have received mixed reviews in the environmental law literature.  See Alejandro E. Camacho, 
Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Case Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) 
(criticizing the program, but also summarizing arguments in its favor).  But the more critical discussions still suggest 
that HCPs can be done well; Camacho, for example, criticizes the program primarily for being overly closed to 
public participation and scrutiny and because of an absence of monitoring and adaptation, but notes that HCPs 
prepared more openly appear to have produced better results.  See id. at 318-19. 
321 The literature on the potential benefits of HCPs is extensive.  See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Environmental 
Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2381 (2002) (explaining potential 
political benefits); Thompson, supra note 30, at 318-19 (describing potential benefits of HCPs, though also 
acknowledging that transaction costs have been substantial). 
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efforts,322 and more extensive enforcement of the adverse modification prohibition could create 
an important incentive for participation in large-scale HCPs.323 
 B.  Praising the Complexity 
The preceding discussion suggests what may seem an odd hybrid of regulatory 
approaches.  It would include elements of prohibitory regulation, negotiated feasibility-based 
standards, trading-based mitigation schemes, and planning-based approaches, all integrated into 
a system that combines slightly increased centralization with a continued reliance on project-by-
project, location-specific regulatory controls.  It may seem like an approach developed by 
indecisively ordering everything on the environmental regulatory menu, notwithstanding years of 
academic arguments asserting that one or a few of those tools is best.324  But the hybrid nature of 
the prescribed reforms reflects the services’ need, in a world of flawed options, for a regulatory 
toolbox with multiple tools. 325  But if a creative and pragmatic agency holds discretion to select 
from among a variety of approaches, the portfolio of regulatory approaches should be superior to 
any of its imperfect parts. 
That need for regulatory portfolios leads to a broader point about regulating complicated 
environmental challenges.  It is easy to look at our environmental law system, with its “great 
undigestible masses of statutes… interpreted by mounds of regulations, all densely packed with 
bizarre terms and opaque acronyms,”326 and pine for some simplicity.  The sometimes-painful, 
                                                
322 See Theodore C. Weber and William L. Allen, Beyond on-site mitigation: An integrated, multi-scale 
approach to environmental mitigation and stewardship for transportation projects, 96 LANDSCAPE AND URBAN 
PLANNING 240 (2010) (describing ways that a coordinated mitigation strategy can outperform site-by-site efforts). 
323 Landowner reluctance to participate has often been flagged as a challenge facing large-scale HCPs.  See 
Thompson, supra note 30, at 318. 
324 See, e.g., Ackerman and Stewart, supra note 295 (advocating trading schemes); Houck, supra note 280 
(feasibility-based controls); Wood, supra note 48 (public trust protections). 
325 See generally Holly Doremus, A policy portfolio approach to biodiversity protection on private lands, 6 
ENVTL. SCI. & POLICY 217 (2003). 
326 Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 1, 1; see Wood, supra note 48, at 57.  To be clear, Rose focuses on making sense of the “undigestible 
masses,” not on developing a simpler regulatory scheme. 
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often contentious history of implementing that system only increases the temptation.  Surely, one 
might think, among those approaches (or waiting to be developed) is a better way, and surely 
many of the existing approaches are deeply flawed or obsolete and can simply be discarded.  But 
the critical habitat experience suggests that such hopes, while perfectly understandable, may well 
be misplaced.  A diversity of regulatory approaches will often be a strength rather than a 
weakness, for there are elements of wisdom in many of the regulatory approaches would-be 
reformers sometimes dismiss.  And while changes and reforms will still be necessary for 
environmental law to take on its next generation of challenges, the critical habitat story suggests 
that some of the changes can be subtle.  Rather than scrapping existing regulatory approaches 
and creating something entirely new, the best reforms may involve doing some modest tinkering 
with existing incentives and approaches, giving agencies a few new tools to use, and trusting, 
notwithstanding all the anti-governmental rhetoric of contemporary politics, that those agencies 
will have the creativity and commitment to put those tools to good use. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The listing of the polar bear as a threatened species and the subsequent designation of its 
critical habitat were not isolated events.  Climate change is likely to lead to many other species 
listings, and dozens of species initially listed for other reasons also face climate change as a 
major threat.327  And climate change is just one of many major environmental impacts caused by 
                                                
327 For just a few of the many possible examples, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Determination of 
Endangered Status for the Georgia Pigtoe Mussel, Interrupted Rocksnail, and Rough Hornsnail and Designation of 
Critical Habitat, 75 Fed. Reg. 67512, 67523 (November 2, 2010) (identifying climate change as a threat); National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Threatened Status for the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin Distinct Population 
Segments of Yelloweye and Canary Rockfish and Endangered Status for the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin Distinct 
Population Segment of Bocaccio Rockfish, 75 Fed. Reg. 22276, 22282 (April 28, 2010) (acknowledging climate 
change as a potentially major threat); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Threatened Status for 
Southern Distinct Population Segment of Eulachon, 75 Fed. Reg. 13012, 13015 (March 18, 2010) (“We also 
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an accumulation of seemingly minor actions.328  The central regulatory challenge addressed by 
this Article is large and is continuing to grow. 
Current regulatory approaches are only partially equipped to address that challenge.  The 
services have taken substantial steps to address habitat degradation, and their efforts undermine 
critiques alleging that ESA implementation is characterized by rigid inflexibility or, 
alternatively, by regulatory capture.  But the empirical record still indicates a substantial gap 
between statutory requirements and actual performance, and the gap is particularly acute where 
incremental degradation is occurring.  That gap need not be quite so large; tools to address some 
of those tensions exist, and could be exploited with only modest adjustments to existing 
regulatory systems.  The services, and any other regulator seeking to address incremental 
environmental degradation, can and should take advantage of those opportunities. 
                                                                                                                                                       
recognize that climate change impact on ocean conditions is likely the most serious threat to persistence of eulachon 
in all four sub-areas of the DPS.”). 
328 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
